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NO CHANCE TO PROVE THEMSELVES: THE RIGHTS OF
MENTALLY DISABLED PARENTS UNDER THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND STATE LAW

Dale Margolin•
ABSTRACT

This article explores the relationship between state child welfare
laws that terminate parental rights and the federal Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA). The article begins by analyzing the application
of the ADA to termination of parental rights proceedings against parents
with mental disabilities. It then surveys state child welfare laws,
focusing on the treatment of parents under New York State law. The
article concludes by advocating for a change to reflect the principles of
the ADA in state laws and in practice.
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INTRODUCTION

"I love mommy. I always want to see her when we go to the agency. "

This is what my five year-old client, Gaby, 1 told me 2 after a onehour visit with her mother, Tanya, which took place in the chaotic
waiting area of their foster care agency. No rooms were available that
day, so Gaby had to play on her mother's lap until the allotted hour was
up. Tanya was composed, though she had certainly had her ups-anddowns as a woman suffering from paranoid schizophrenia. Still, she had
never missed a visit with Gaby in the five years the child was in foster
care, and had diligently followed all other court orders - to attend
therapy and parenting classes, and to consistently test negative for drugs.
She lived independently and had successfully cared for Gaby on the
sporadic overnight visits she had been granted.

1

For purposes of preserving attorney-client confidentiality, all client and party
names have been changed.
2
I represented Gaby as a law guardian in New York State Family Court. Under
New York law, the law guardian "help[s] protect [the minor's] interests and
[expresses his or her] wishes to the court." N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT§ 241 (2007).

114

Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law

[Vol. 15:1

As Tanya pulled toys and clothing out of a shopping bag for Gaby,
she asked me about the petition to terminate her parental rights based on
mental illness, which was pending in New York State Family Court.
The foster care agency considered it a heartbreaking case because of
Tanya's compliance with the court orders, her steadfast love for Gaby,
and their undeniably strong bond. But the agency was going forward
with the petition so Gaby could be adopted by her current foster mother.
I didn't want to explain to Tanya3 what I knew would likely happen: her
rights would be terminated because her mental illness rendered her
"unable" to care for Gaby. Gaby had told me she wanted to live with her
foster mother, but had also expressed a strong and consistent desire to
see Tanya regularly. By the time the case went to trial, I no longer
represented Gaby and could not express her wishes to the court. But I
doubt it would have made a difference; Tanya's parental rights could be
terminated with ease under New York statutes and case law.
This article examines the relationship between state child welfare
laws that terminate parental rights and the federal Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA). I focus on the treatment of parents who suffer
from mental illness or mental retardation under New York Social
Services Law; it is one of many state statutes that, I argue, are in
violation of the ADA.
In Section I, I discuss the scope of the ADA, including whether and
how it can apply to termination of parental rights proceedings (TPRs).
Section II explores the treatment of mentally disabled parents under state
child welfare law, focusing on New York, and the relevance of this
treatment to the ADA. I posit that New York State law and other state
statutes are discriminatory on their face under the ADA because they
terminate the rights of mentally disabled parents on the basis of status
and speculation over future behavior. It is also my contention that New
York's law is uniquely discriminatory in that mentally disabled parents
are never entitled to services or a dispositional hearing at the conclusion
of their TPR trials. A parent in New York State can have her rights
terminated without a single opportunity to ameliorate her situation,
flying in the face of the purpose and mandate of the ADA. In Section
III, I conclude by calling for a change in state laws and practice,
particularly those of New York, by taking into account how a few states
have amended their statutes since the passage of the ADA to incorporate
3

As Gaby's counsel, I would not have advised an adversary; however, I did
have permission to speak with Tanya from her attorney.
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this landmark federal legislation into their case law.
I. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (ADA) AND TERMINATION
OF PARENT AL RIGHTS PROCEEDINGS (TPRS)

A. TITLE II OF THE ADA
The ADA, enacted in 1990 with strong support from a diverse
coalition in Congress as well as the American public, is civil rights
legislation intended to remedy discrimination against disabled
individuals. 4 Over 54 million Americans are protected under the ADA, 5
including anyone with a "mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more ... major life activities ... ; a record of such an impairment; or
being regarded as having such an impairment."6 Mental impairment is
defined as "[a]ny mental or psychological disorder such as mental
retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and
specific learning disabilities." 7
Prior legislation, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, had
prohibited discrimination against disabled individuals by governmental
and private entities who received federal financial assistance. 8 Title II of
the ADA similarly proscribes discrimination on the basis of disability by
a public entity, which includes (1) any state or local government, and (2)
any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality
of a state or states or local government. 9 The regulations addressing the
implementation of Title II state that it applies to "all services, programs,
and activities provided or made available by public entities." 10
4

Kevin L. Cope, Comment, Sutton Misconstrued: Why the ADA Should Now
Permit Employers to Make Their Employees Disabled, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1753,
1758 (2004).
See OFFICE ON DISABILITY, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, ADA
FACT SHEET (2005), http://www.hhs.gov/od/documents/ADAFactSheet.doc; see
also LITA JANS & SUSAN STODDARD, CHARTBOOK ON WOMEN AND DISABILITY
IN THE UNITED STATES § 4.2 ( 1991 ), available at
http://www.infouse.com/disabilitydata/womendisability (including at least 6.9
million Americans with disabilities between the ages of 18 and 64 who are
custodial parents).
6
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C) (2007).
7
28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2007).
8
29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (2007).
9
42 U.S.C. §12131 (l)(A)-(B) (2007).
10
28 C.F.R. § 35.102 (2007).
5
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B. THE APPLICATION OF TITLE II TO TPRS
Title II does not specifically indicate whether court proceedings,
including termination of parental rights trials, are "state activity." 11 But
the fact-findings 12 and the purpose statement, which invokes "the sweep
of congressional authority," 13 indicate that Congress intended the ADA
to eliminate all forms of state discrimination, with Title II specifically
targeted to public services (as opposed to Title I, which applies only to
employment, and Title III, to public facilities). Congress' goal was "to
provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing
discrimination against individuals [and] to ensure that the Federal
Government plays a central role in enforcing the standards." 14 Congress
also stipulated that the ADA is "a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination." 15 Indeed, the application
of the ADA to termination of parental rights proceedings was not beyond
the scope of Congress' findings. 16

1. Federal Interpretations of Title II
The Department of Justice (DOJ) considers court actions to be "state
activity" for purposes of the ADA. The DOJ has specifically prohibited
discrimination in all state judicial systems receiving federal financial
assistance. 17 According to the Supreme Court, the DOJ is crucial when
interpreting Title II: "[b ]ecause the Department [of Justice] is the agency
directed by Congress to issue regulations implementing Title II ... its
views warrant respect." 18

11

42 U.S.C. § 12131 {l)(A)-(B).
See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 526 (2004) (discussing that in the
deliberations that led to the enactment of the ADA, Congress found "hundreds
of examples of unequal treatment of persons with disabilities by States and their
political subdivisions").
13
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (2007).
14
§ 1210l(b)(2)-(3).
15
§ 1210l(b){l).
16
See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 1O1-485, Part 3 at 25 (1990) (House Judiciary
Committee Report on the ADA observing that "discriminatory policies and
practices affect people with disabilities in every aspect of their lives," including
"securing custody of their children").
17
28 C.F.R. § 42.503(a)-(f) (2007) (applying to all court systems receiving
federal financial assistance).
18
Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 597-98 (1999).
12
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The Supreme Court itself has held that providing the disabled with
access to courts is a constitutional mandate of Title Il. 19 According to
the Court, the "unequal treatment of disabled persons in the
administration of judicial services has a long history,"20 which the ADA
sought to redress. States must provide a "meaningful opportunity to be
heard," 21 including reasonable accommodations for paraplegic and
hearing and visually impaired litigants. Of particular relevance to
mentally disabled parents, the Court cited the "failure to permit
testimony of adults with developmental disabilities" 22 as one of the
congressional findings leading to the enactment of the ADA.
The Supreme Court has not, however, directly addressed whether the
substance of state court proceedings, or specifically TPRs, constitutes a
state "activity" or "service."23 But the Court's Title II jurisprudence
indicates a broad interpretation of "service." Incarceration counts,
regardless of the fact that prison services are involuntary and not wholly
for the benefit of the prisoner. 24
Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that "the fact the [ADA] can
be 'applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not
demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth. "'25 Federal courts also
have interpreted Title II broadly, applying it to social services; 26 access
to public areas 27 and public meetings; 28 arrests; 29 education; 30 housing; 31
loans; 32 and transportation, 33 to name a few. Notably, the Ninth Circuit
19

Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. at 546 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
Id. at 531 (majority opinion).
21
Id. at 532.
22
Id. at 527.
23
The Supreme Court has not ruled on the applicability of Title II to TPRs.
Most recently, it denied a petition for a writ of certiorari in the case of In re
Kayla N., 900 A.2d 1202 (R.I. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1372 (2007).
24
Yeskey v. Pennsylvania, 524 U.S. 206 (1998).
25
Id. at 212 (citing Sedima, S. P.R. L. v. Irnrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985)).
26
Henrietta v. Bloomberg, 331F.3d261 (2d Cir. 2003).
27
Tennesee v. Lane, 541 U.S. at 511.
28
Pascuiti v. N.Y. Yankees, 87 F. Supp. 2d 221, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
29
Delano-Pyle v. Victoria County, 302 F.3d 567 (5th Cir. 2002).
30
Smith v. Univ. of State ofN.Y., 1997 WL 800882 (W.D.N.Y. 1997); Essen v.
Bd. of Educ. of Ithaca City Sch. Dist. 16 A.D.D. 179 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); Garret
v. Chi. Reform Bd. ofTrs., 17 A.D.D. 810 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
31
Burgess v. Alameda Hous. Auth., 98 Fed. Appx. 603 (9th Cir. 2004).
32
Gaona v. Town & Country Credit, 324 F.3d 1050, 1056 (8th Cir. 2003).
20
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has applied Title II to parole proceedings, 34 which, according to the
court, exist to protect the public, 35 just as TPRs serve to protect
children. 36 In New York, the Second Circuit has held that "programs,
services, or activities" is a "catch-all phrase that prohibits all
discrimination by a public entity, regardless of the context." 37
2. State Interpretations of Title II

In spite of federal guidance and case law, many state courts have
held that TPRs are not a state activity or service. The courts reason that
TPRs are about parents' rights and children's best interests; not state
programs. Appendix A contains a table of state court decisions
regarding the applicability of the ADA to TPRs and the use of the ADA
as a defense at TPRs.
In New York, a trial court held that TPRs are "not services,
programs, or activities." 38 According to the court, "the ADA was
designed to deal with access to public services and accommodations,
rather than to alter the rights of parents in state termination of parental
rights statutes."39 Other states have similarly held that court proceedings
are not a state activity or service. 40

33

Tandy v. City of Wichita, 380 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004); Bd. ofTrs. of the
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 379 (11th Cir. 2001).
34
Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2002).
35
Id. at 896-99.
36
See, e.g., New York's TPR statute, N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b, which
provides that "it is the intent of the legislature . . . to provide procedures ...
where positive ... parent-child relationships no longer exist, furthering the best
interests, needs, and rights of the child by terminating parental rights." See also
infra note 69.
37
Innovative Health Sys., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 37, 45 (2d Cir.
1997).
38
In re La' Asia S., 739 N.Y.S.2d 898, 909. (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2002).
39 Id.
40
See, e.g., In re Kayla N., 900 A.2d 1202 (Supp. Ct. R.I. 2006); In re Ronald
Dietrich, 2006 WL 2355135 (Mich. App.); In re Ivan M. 2006 WL 1487173
(Cal.App. 4 Dist.); Adoption of Terrence, 787 N.E.2d 572, 577 (Mass. App. Ct.
2003); In re Antony B., 735 A.2d 893, 899 (Conn. App. 1999); State ex rel.
B.K.F., 704 So.2d 314, 317 (La. App. 1997); In re B.S., Juvenile, 693 A.2d 716,
720-721 (Vt. 1997).
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However, some courts have found the ADA applicable to TPRs. In
Matter of MH. and G.H., 41 the Supreme Court of Montana entertained
the claim of the respondent father that he suffered from a mental
impairment which was not reasonably accommodated under the ADA;
however, the court held that the father would need assistance '"every
minute' ... in order to get. .. to a point at which he would be a minimally
adequate parent," and that this would be a fundamental alteration in state
services, which is not required by the ADA. 42 Similarly, in the Interest
of K.K., 43 the Court of Appeals of Iowa held that the state complied with
the ADA in the way it treated a mother with a substance abuse
problem. 44 According to the Alaska Supreme Court, an ADA violation
could bar a showing of "reasonable efforts" as necessary before
termination. 45
Other courts have acknowledged the applicability of the ADA to
TPRs, despite procedural problems. In In re K.M, 46 the Court of
Appeals of Kansas held that the mother's ADA claim was moot, but then
went on to note that she failed to make a prima facie ADA case, because
she did not provide evidence that she was disabled. Likewise, in In re
T.M, 47 the Court of Appeals of Iowa held that the mentally retarded
mother could argue that the state's treatment of her was discriminatory
under the ADA at a TPR, but such a claim would have to be made first at
a removal or review hearing, or when services were offered; a similar

41

143 P.3d 103, 107 (Mont. 2006).
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2007).
43
No. 4-173/04-0166, 2004 LEXIS 556, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2004),
ajf'd 682 N.W.2d 83 (2004).
44
Washington State also has applied the ADA to TPR proceedings, though no
actual violations have been found. See, e.g., In re Dependency of C.C., No.
40888-7-1, 1999 WL 106824, at *5 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 1999); In re
Welfare of A.J.R. 896 P.2d 1298, 1302 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995).
45
J.H. v. State Dep't of Health & Social Services, 30 P.3d 79, 86 n.11 (Alaska
2001) (assuming, arguendo, that the ADA applies to TPR proceedings, but
holding that "AS 47.10.086(a)'s requirement that the department make
reasonable efforts to provide [respondent] with family support services appears
to be essentially identical to the ADA's reasonable accommodation
requirement"); In re Terry, 610 N.W.2d 563, 570 (Mich. App. 2000) (holding
same, while simultaneously finding that a parent may not raise the ADA as a
defense to a TPR).
46
131P.3d1281, 1285 (Kan. App. 2006).
47
715 N.W.2d 771 (Iowa Ct. App. 2006).
42
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finding was made in In re Prentiss Ratliff for a mentally ill mother who
first raised the ADA on appeal of a TPR. 48
Several courts have specifically held that states are obligated under
the ADA to be non-discriminatory in their treatment of respondent
parents, even if the ADA does not directly apply to TPRs. In In re
Aundre Murphy, 49 the Michigan Court of Appeals stated, "the ADA does
require ... the ... Agency to make reasonable accommodations for those
individuals with disabilities so that all persons may receive the benefits
of public programs and services." The court went on to note that the
ADA is not a defense to a TPR; however, it analyzed the record to see
whether the mentally disabled father was properly accommodated. 50 In
Roby v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Services, 51 the Arkansas Court of
Appeals also acknowledged that the ADA is relevant at a TPR by noting
that the state provided "reasonable accommodations in accordance with
the ADA" to a mentally ill parent.
Even some courts which wholly refuse to entertain ADA claims
have acknowledged that the services involved in TPRs must be nondiscriminatory. The Vermont Supreme Court specifically stated that by
not entertaining an ADA claim it did "not mean to suggest that parents
lack any remedy for [the agency's] alleged violations of the ADA. We
hope that the effect of this decision is to encourage parents and other
recipients of [agency] services to raise complaints about services
vigorously and in a timely fashion." 52 Numerous other states have held
that the ADA applies to reunification services, 53 but that parents can only
litigate ADA claims in federal court or following other procedures under
the ADA. 54
48

No. 04AP-803, 2005 WL 675798, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2005). See
also In re John D., 934 P.2d 308, 313-15 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that
"Section 12132 of the ADA [applies] in situations where a state has a statutory
duty or otherwise undertakes to assist a person," including TPRs, but finding
that section inapplicable because the ground for TPR was abandonment and the
state did not have a statutory obligation to provide services to any parent in an
abandonment case).
49
No. 250791, 2004 WL 895950, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. April 27, 2004).
50 Id.
51
No. CA 06-626, 2006 WL 3425011, at *3 (Ark. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2006).
52
In re B.S., Juvenile, 693 A.2d 716, 722-23 (Vt. 1997).
53
See definition infra note 120.
54
See In re Doe, 60 P.3d 285, 291 (Haw. 2002); In re Chance Jahmel B., 723
N.Y.S.2d 634, 640 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2001); Adoption of Gregory, 747 N.E.2d
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Likewise, Indiana held that if services are provided, they must be
non-discriminatory. 55 "When an agency opts to provide services to assist
parents in improving parental skills, the provision of those services must
be in compliance with the ADA." 56 The court found, however, that an
ADA violation was not a defense to a TPR, solely because all parents
were treated the same way under Indiana law. 57 Regardless of disability,
no parent in Indiana was entitled to services before a TPR at the time of
this ruling. 58
Overall, courts are reluctant to apply the ADA to TPRs outright, but
many acknowledge its principles of equitable treatment in holdings and
in dicta.
3. An Alternative Interpretation of the ADA 's Application to TPR
Proceedings
Even if the general consensus of state courts is that a TPR is not a
. state activity or service, it can be argued that the ADA still applies to the
proceeding because it involves an examination of other services that are
administered by the state. Indeed, many courts have alluded to this
interpretation. 59 As noted above, social services fall under the umbrella
of Title II, including those administered through contract agencies (all
state, county, municipal and contract agencies will be referred to herein
as "agencies"); Title II regulations prohibit discrimination by the state
either directly or "through contractual, licensing, or other

120, 126-127 (Mass. 2001); In re Anthony P., 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 423, 425-426
(Cal. App. 2000); In re Harmon, No. 00 CA 2693, 2000 WL 1424822, at *12
(Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 25, 2000); In re Antony B., 735 A.2d 893, 899 n.9 (Conn.
App. 1999); In re AP., 728 A.2d 375, 379 (Pa. Super. 1999); In re B.S., 693
A.2d at 722; In re Torrance P., 522 N.W.2d 243, 246 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994). But
see infra note 81.
55
In re E.E., 736 N.E.2d 791, 796 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
56
Id. at 796.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59
See, e.g., J.H. v. State, 30 P.3d 79; Roby, 2006 WL 3425011; In re E.E., 736
N.E.2d 791; In re K.K., 682 N.W.2d 83; In re T.M., 715 N.W.2d 771; In re
K.M., 131P.3d1281; In re Murphy, 2004 WL 895950; In re Terry, 610 N.W.2d
563; In re MH., 143 P.3d 103; In re John D., 934 P.2d 308; In re Ratliff, 2005
WL 675798; In re Welfare of A.JR., 896 P.2d 1298; In re Dependency of C.C.,
1999 WL 106824.
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arrangements."60 Services offered to parents are an inherent part of the
evidence used by both sides in a TPR. 61 In order to make a
determination, the court looks at the state's actions with regard to the
parent and whether the parent complied with the service plan; even in a
mental disability case, where in certain situations service plans are not
mandated, some contact with the parent will have to be made and, later,
examined at trial.
The ADA prohibits one public entity from perpetuating another
public entity's discrimination if "both entities are subject to common
administrative control or are agencies of the same State."62 State and
contract agencies, as well as family and juvenile courts, are both under
the jurisdiction of state laws63 (and are both subject to Title II64 ).
Therefore, if an agency has discriminated against a parent by not making
appropriate contact with him or her, a family court cannot perpetuate this
lack of action by admitting the agency's evidence without allowing the
parent to challenge it; one such way is to argue that the evidence violates
the ADA.

C. THE ADA AS A DEFENSE AT TPR PROCEEDINGS
Even if a state acknowledges that Title II applies to a TPR, it still has
been difficult for parents actually to raise the ADA as a defense to the
termination of their rights. The ADA applies to TPRs because of the
breadth of Title II and because a failure to provide appropriate services is
an attack on the evidence (such as testimony and records) the state uses
to prove the termination.
There are, however, other challenges to raising the ADA defense at a
TPR. State and contract agencies argue that state law, not the ADA,

60

28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(l) (2007).
As acknowledged by the Alaska Supreme Court, J.H. v. State Dep 't, 30 P.3d
at 86 n.11.
62
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(3)(iii) (2007).
63
See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT (McKinney 2007); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
(West 2007).
64
See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(l) (2007) (prohibiting a public entity from
discriminating either directly or "through contractual, licensing, or other
arrangements").
61
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governs their conduct. 65 Some courts have been favorable to this
argument: "Congress did not intend to change the obligations imposed
by unrelated statutes."66 In Vermont, the Supreme Court went further,
holding that the limited jurisdiction of the juvenile court prohibits it from
entertaining "side issues that do not directly concern the status of the
juvenile before it."67 The court feared that an "open-ended inquiry into
how the parents might respond to alternative ... services" would "ignore
the needs of the child and divert the attention of the court to disputes
between [social services] and the parents."68 As a Florida Court of
Appeals stated, "dependency proceedings are held for the benefit of the
child, not the parent. " 69
But, as contended, the TPR and the ADA are inherently related: the
TPR involves an examination of both a person's disability and the state's
implementation of services. 7 Furthermore, contrary to the fears of some
state courts, allowing a parent to assert a violation of the ADA does not
mean that that the child's rights will be compromised. 71 The child is
always the focus of a family court proceeding, even when the court is
examining a potential violation of the ADA. 72 In virtually every state,
the "best interest" of the child is considered during the TPR. 73
Furthermore, a parent's evidentiary attack should not be viewed as
necessarily contrary to the interests and rights of a child; if a parent has
been discriminated against, and the parent-child relationship is severed,
in part or in whole, because of this discriminatory treatment, the

°

65

See, e.g., M.C. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 750 So.2d 705 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2000); In re B.S., 693 A.2d 716 (Vt. 1997); In re Torrance P., 522 N.W.2d
243 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).
66
In re Torrance P., 522 N.W.2d at 246.
67
In re B.S., 693 A.2d at 721.
68 Id.
69
MC. v. Dep 't of Children & Families, 750 So.2d at 706.
70
See supra text accompanying note 59.
71
The purpose of child protection statutes is to protect the safety and interests of
children. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT§ 1011 (McKinney 2007) ("This article
is designed to establish procedures to help protect children from injury or
mistreatment and to help safeguard their physical, mental, and emotional wellbeing."); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-800 (2007); 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 6302 (2007).
72
See supra note 69.
73
See Appendix D.
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severance has drastic, 74 and potentially harmful, 75 consequences for the
child.
Moreover, Title II would have no purpose if states could fail to
accommodate disabled people as long as they did so through "unrelated"
statutes. Most statutes involving state services, programs, and activities
were in place long before the ADA and are not specifically related to the
disabled. 76 But they are precisely that which Congress intended to target
in invoking its "sweep"; 77 if states could argue that their laws were
"unrelated," Congress would have had no reason to enact Title II.
Rather, courts have appropriately found that Title II is significant in
examining these services, programs, and activities. 78
In addition, agencies have argued that the ADA cannot be raised at
the TPR because denial of a TPR is not an appropriate remedy for a
violation of the ADA. According to a New York court, nothing in the
ADA suggests that denial of a TPR is a remedy under the Act, though a
respondent might be able to sue for monetary damages in federal court. 79
This view has been reiterated by numerous courts, 80 even though at least

74

As long as the child welfare agency is involved (which will usually be for at
least a year, while the child awaits adoption, see infra note 159), the child will
not be allowed any contact with the parent. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. § 384-b
(permitting courts to terminate parental rights, after which the biological parentchild relationship has no legal meaning); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1089(a)(l)
(McKinney 2007) (providing that a parent whose rights have been terminated
will not be notified of permanency hearings); In re April C., 31 A.D.3d 1200
(N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (finding that respondent lacked to standing to challenge
permanency hearing orders because her parental rights had been terminated).
75
See infra notes 316-22.
76
See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65000 (2007); N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 225
(McKinney 2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6086 (2007).
77
See supra text accompanying note 13.
78
See, e.g., Innovative Health Sys. Inc. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 37 (2d
Cir. 1997).
79
In re La' Asia S., 739 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
80
See, e.g., In re Brendan C., 874 A.2d 826, 836 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005); In re
E.T.C., 141 S.W.3d 39, 48 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004); In re Doe, 60 P.3d 285, 291-93
(Haw. 2002); Adoption of Gregory, 747 N.E.2d 120, 125 (Mass. 2001); In re
Kassandra T., No. 01-1477, 2001 WL 1243364, at *3 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 18,
2001).
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one federal district court has held that it cannot hear a TPR-related ADA
claim, so long as there is a pending state proceeding. 81
This reasoning is flawed. First of all, when a parent raises the ADA
at a TPR, she is not attempting to litigate the violation in family court, or
claiming that a dismissal of the TPR is a remedy. Instead, she is
attacking the agency's evidence and its presumption that it has treated
her fairly and in accordance with the law. If she has been discriminated
against, the TPR should be rejected because of flawed evidence, not
because of an ADA violation per se.
Moreover, as established above, Congress intended the ADA to be
broad. Legislators were strongly influenced82 by the Supreme Court's
finding in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline that "society's
accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as
handicapping as ... physical limitations." 83 There is no evidence that
Congress had a different intent from what the plain language stemming
from these findings indicates. 84
Furthermore, as discussed, the Supreme Court promoted the scope of
the ADA (applying it to prison services) by holding that Title H's
ambiguity "demonstrates breadth."85 Federal cases such as Innovative
Health Systems, Inc. v. City of White Plains 86 and Civic Association of
the Deaf v. Giuliam.s 7 have reiterated that, as a remedial statute, the ADA
must be broadly construed or the congressional purpose will be
81

McLeod v. State Dep't of Human Servs., No. 99-233-P-H, 1999 WL
33117123, at *l (D. Me. Nov. 2, 1999) (granting defendant's motion to dismiss
on grounds that "[a] federal court, pursuant to the Younger doctrine, must
abstain from hearing a case over which it has jurisdiction 'so long as there is ( 1)
an ongoing state judicial proceeding ... that (2) implicates an important state
interest, and (3) provides an adequate opportunity for the plaintiff to raise the
claims advanced in [her] federal lawsuit"').
82
See Michael L. Perlin, "What's Good is Bad, What's Bad is Good, You'll
Find out When You Reach the Top, You 're on the Bottom": Are the Americans
with Disabilities Act (and Olmstead v. L.C.) Anything More than "Idiot Wind!'',
35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 235, 242 (2002).
83
Arline, 480 U.S. at 284.
84
See supra notes 13-17.
85
Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 212.
86
Innovative Health Sys., 117 F.3d 37.
87
Civic Ass'n of the DeafofN.Y. City v. Giuliani, 970 F. Supp 352 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).
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frustrated. 88 As the Second Circuit stated, "Title II's enforcement
provision extends relief to 'any person alleging discrimination on the
basis of disability. "'89 There is nothing in the statute to indicate that it is
inappropriate for a parent to raise a violation of the ADA at a state TPR
trial.
Another argument agencies make is that alleged ADA violations
must be raised before TPRs, either at the dispositional hearing following
the initial finding of child abuse or neglect, or at a permanency hearing
or a service plan review while the child is in foster care. 9 Courts have
held that parents must identify why the agency's service plan is
inappropriate and what kinds of services they should be receiving. 91
According to a Massachusetts court, "a parent who believes that the
department is not reasonably accommodating her disability 'should
claim a violation ... either when the ... plan is adopted, when [she]
receives those services, or shortly thereafter. "'92 A New York court
similarly held that the ADA may "provide a sound argument at a
permanency hearing for the development of an individualized service
plan including reasonable accommodations."93

°

However, as anyone who has practiced in this field knows, family
court cases do not always proceed so smoothly. Courts in New York, for
example, frequently fail to order concrete service plans at the
dispositional hearings following neglect and abuse fact-finding trials. 94
88

See id. at 361.
Innovative Health Sys., 117 F.3d at 47.
90
These terms are used in New York State. The disposition is the hearing
immediately following a fact-finding for neglect or abuse and determines the
child's best interest and the parent's service plan, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT§ 1045;
the permanency hearing takes places within eight months after the child was
first removed and placed in foster care, and every six months thereafter, § 1089;
a service plan review is an out of court meeting with the parents, child, and
agency which also takes place every six months, N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 409e(2)-(3) (2006). All states have hearings and meetings after the initial factfinding, though different states use different terminology. See statutes cited in
Appendix B.
91
Terrence, 787 N.E.2d at 577-78; In re M.C., Jr. D.C., N.C., No. 02-0860,
2002 WL 1758359, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. July 31, 2002).
92
Terrence, 787 N.E.2d at 577-78.
93
In re Chance Jahmel B., 723 N.Y.S.2d at 640.
94
See In re Latasha F., 251 A.D.2d 1005, 1006 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (stating
that respondent mother "would be required to demonstrate her ability to provide
89
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At the post neglect-finding disposition against Tanya (the respondent
mother of the case described in the Introduction), the court only
stipulated that she attend biweekly therapy, maintain sobriety, and secure
housing, and that the agency perform random urine analysis on her.
These stipulations are identical to those made for non-disabled parents in
the majority of abuse and neglect proceedings in New York. 95 The court
did not say how progress was to be measured in therapy and did not
order Tanya to take medication or to comply with programs specific to
individuals, or to parents, with schizophrenia. 96 This omission is
common for dispositional orders following abuse and neglect findings. 97
The court also made no mention of alcohol counseling, even though the
agency indicated a concern over Tanya's alcohol use, which further
illustrates the ways in which dispositional orders often fail to be
holistic. 98

a safe and adequate home environment for the child before the child was
returned to her care and custody").
95
See In re Allen T. and Noah T., 801 N.Y.S.2d 776 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2005)
(dispositional order for non-disabled parent was to: 1) submit to an evaluation
for drug/alcohol abuse counseling and to follow the recommendation of the
evaluators, 2) submit to a psychological evaluation and to follow the
recommendation of the evaluator, and 3) obtain housing); In re Brandon 00.,
304 A.D.2d 873 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (non-disabled respondent to participate
in mental health counseling, complete a substance abuse treatment program,
refrain from using illegal drugs and alcohol, and complete a protective parenting
class); In re Latasha F., 251 A.D.2d 1005 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (DSS service
plan for non-disabled incarcerated mother was to attend drug and alcohol
counseling and provide a safe and adequate home for the child). See also In re
Clarence Michael W., 33 A.D.3d 485 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); In re Octavia
Lorraine 0., 34 A.D.3d 258 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); In re Emma L., 35 A.D.3d
250 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); In re Amani T., 33 A.D.3d 542 (N.Y. App. Div.
2006); In re Alec B., 34 A.D.3d 1110 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); In re Edward
GG., 35 A.D.3d 1144 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); In re Dessa F., 35 A.D.3d 1096
(N.Y. App. Div. 2006); In re Brian C., 31 A.D.3d 1124 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006);
In re Jose R., 32 A.D.3d 1284 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); In re Raena 0., 31
A.D.3d 946 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).
96
Parenting classes for individuals with mental illnesses are offered in New
York City. The Brooklyn Borough of Community Service provides homemaker
services to parents with disabilities that focus on managing the household and
parenting skills. Posting of adult services,
http://www.bbcs.org/programs.php#adult (last visited Nov. 6, 2007).
97
See, e.g., In re Brandon 0., 304 A.D.2d 873 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
98
See, e.g., In re Latasha F., 251A.D.2d1005 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
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The argument that a parent must raise an ADA violation prior to the
TPR trial is also problematic in that, even if a court's orders at
disposition are characterized as the "service plan," a parent and her
counsel cannot know how the agency will accommodate her after the
plan has commenced. 99 In Tanya's case, the agency did not comply with
its plan: although it performed the drug tests and made a referral for
parenting classes, it failed to provide any meaningful assistance with
housing. Such assistance was crucial, as Tanya was living intermittently
with her brother, but the court made it clear that it would not discharge
Gaby to the brother's home. The caseworker never referred Tanya for
public housing or discussed with her the option of moving to a
residential facility for a period of time in order to become stable. The
caseworker also never explored the possibility of Gaby living with her
mother in an assisted facility, even though an assisted living situation
can be a viable reunification plan for parents with mental disabilities and
would promote the ADA's objective of integration into the
community. 10 Furthermore, homelessness, while extremely difficult for
anyone, can exacerbate the symptoms of a person suffering from
schizophrenia. 101 Thus, in failing to explore housing possibilities, the
caseworker likely perpetuated the problems that necessitated removing

°

99

See Jn re Allen T. and Noah T., 801 N.Y.S.2d 776 (finding that agency failed
to follow-up appropriately with dispositional orders, while respondent did
"virtually everything" to comply); In re Latasha F., 251 A.D.2d 1005 (finding
that agency failed to advise incarcerated respondent, who had complied with
services and visitation, that her plan for the care and return of her child was
unacceptable, and did not assist her in formulating a new plan before filing a
TPR).
100
See L.C., 527 U.S. 581; Henrietta, 331 F.3d 261; Helen L. v. Didario, 46
F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 1995) (discussing intensive case management). Possible
facilities in New York City include: Center for Urban Community Services posting of vacancies available through the Center for Urban Community
Services, http://www.cucs.org (last visited Nov. 6, 2007); Unique People,
posting of vacancies available through Unique People, http://www.forhome.org
(last visited Nov. 6, 2007); Women In Need, posting of vacancies available
through Women In Need, http://www.women-in-need.org/ (last visited Nov. 6,
2007).
101
For studies examining the relationship between life stressors and
schizophrenic symptoms, see Ross M.G. Norman & Ashok K. Malla, Stressful
Life Events and Schizophrenia I: A Review of the Research, 162 BRIT. J.
PSYCHIATRY 161-166 (1993); Joseph Ventura et al., A Prospective Study of
Stressful Life Events and Schizophrenic Relapse, 98 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL.
407-411 (1989).
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Gaby from Tanya's care. Tanya's transient home situation is common
among mentally disabled parents, who require accommodation with
respect to housing. 102
Moreover, the caseworker failed to follow-up with Tanya's therapist
about the appropriateness of her treatment and strategies for fostering
reunification, including options such as in-home services. 103 Lastly, the
caseworker did not offer job assistance and/or referrals for educational
opportunities. Tanya had held several clerical jobs, but was not
employed during the time of the child protective proceedings. She told
the caseworker that she enjoyed working, and employment or classes
may have stabilized her. 104 Indeed, throughout most of the time Gaby
was in foster care (close to five years), Tanya was on her own, without
help from the agency. And because the TPR that emanated from the
original case was based on mental illness, in the end it did not matter that
she had complied with all of the dispositional orders; at the TPR, the
agency only had to prove, through the testimony of a court-appointed
psychiatrist, that Tanya was incapable of providing adequate care for
Gaby now and in the foreseeable future. 105
A lack of counsel at permanency hearings in New York and around
the country also inhibits raising ADA claims. In New York, most
respondent parents were unrepresented at permanency hearings prior to
legislation enacted in 2004. 106 Because a TPR fact-finding is likely to
102

JOANNE NICHOLSON ET AL., CRITICAL ISSUES FOR PARENTS WITH MENTAL
ILLNESS AND THEIR FAMILIES 14 (Center for Mental Health Services Research,
Department of Psychiatry University of Massachusetts Medical School 2001 ).
103
Services such as homemaker services can be provided to prevent foster care
or reunify families. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 423.2(b)(5) (2007).
104
See Gary R. Bond et al., Does Competitive Employment Improve
Nonvocational Outcomes for People with Severe Mental Illness?, 69 J.
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 489, 497-99 (2001).
IOS N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§§ 384-b(4)(c), 6(e) (McKinney 2007).
106
According to N.Y. FAM. Cr. ACT § 262 (McKinney 2006), respondent
parents are entitled to representation at all child protective proceedings.
However, prior to a law taking effect in 2004 which increased the rate-of-pay
for court appointed lawyers (Act effective Jan. 1, 2004, ch. 62, pt. J, sec. 5,
2003 N.Y. Sess. Laws as applied to N.Y. JUD LAW§ 35 (McKinney 2007) and
N.Y. COUNTY LAW§ 722(b), (c), (t) (McKinney 2007); see also infra note 260),
there was a shortage of court appointed attorneys in New York. See JULIA
VITULLO-MARTIN & BRIAN MAXEY, NEW YORK FAMILY COURT: COURT USER
PERSPECTIVES 12-16 (Vera Institute of Justice 2000), available at
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take place years after a child has entered foster care, 107 a substantial
portion of recent and pending TPRs have a history of permanency
hearings in which the parents lacked representation. 108 Furthermore,
prior to 2004, even if a parent had a lawyer at one permanency hearing,
she was not necessarily represented by the same person at the next
hearing, or at the TPR. 109 In Tanya's case, she did not have
representation at any of the permanency hearings. Without a lawyer,
Tanya could not have been expected to know that she was entitled to
reasonably accommodated services under the ADA, and that the services
she was receiving were not appropriate. Like most respondent parents,
her goal was to follow the agency's plan without objection, because that
is the only path to reunification. At least one other state has
acknowledged the importance of counsel in this regard: "[w]hile it could
be argued that Mother was hampered in asking for assistance ... we note
that Mother was represented by counsel, who could have notified DHS
on [her] behalf. " 110
http://www.vera.org/publication_pdf/nyfamilycourt.pdf; KLAUS EPPLER ET AL.,
REPORT OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION FIRST DEPARTMENT COMMITTEE ON
REPRESENTATION OF THE POOR: CRISIS IN THE LEGAL REPRESENTAT!ON OF THE
POOR (2001), available at http://nysl.nysed.gov/Archimages/4826.PDF; Somini
Sengupta, Lack of Lawyers Crippling Family Court, Report Says, N.Y. Times,
May 14, 2000, § 1, at 35. Because of this shortage, respondent parents did not
retain their appointed counsel from the original neglect proceedings, and were
rarely, if ever, notified of their right to an attorney at permanency hearings. It
was unusual for a parent to have representation at permanency hearings. JULIA
VITULLO-MARTIN & BRIAN MAXEY, NEW YORK FAMILY COURT: COURT USER
PERSPECTIVES 15 (Vera Institute of Justice 2000), available at
http://www.vera.org/pub lication_pdf/nyfamilycourt. pdf.
107
The reasons for this are threefold: the goal upon entering foster care is almost
always reunification (infra notes 127- 28); the agency ordinarily will not file a
petition for TPR until the child has been in care at least 15 months (infra note
112); and the family court calendar is extremely backlogged (see VitulloMartin, supra note 106; Eppler, supra note 106; Sengupta, supra note 106; infra
note 159 (the average length of time in foster care in New York, as elsewhere, is
58 months)).
108
See, e.g., In re Destiny CC., 40 A.D.3d 1167 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007); In re
Dessa F., 35 A.D.3d 1096 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); In re Vivian 00., 34 A.D.3d
1111 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); Termination of Parental Rights Proceeding
Lakeside Family and Children's Service v. Conchita J., 814 N.Y.S.2d 565 (N.Y.
Fam. Ct. 2005); In re W.N., 801 N.Y.S.2d 243 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2005); In re
Edward V.V., 814 N.Y.S.2d 560 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2005).
109
Vitullo-Marten, supra note 106.
110
In re Jane Doe, 60 P.3d 285, 294 (Haw. 2002).
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Furthermore, under the federal 1997 Adoption and Safe Families Act
(ASFA), 111 even if a parent raises an ADA violation at a permanency
hearing, in most states, a TPR still could be filed if her child has been in
foster care for 15 of the previous 22 months. 112 Thus, a permanency
hearing should not be the only time that courts entertain the ADA.
A parent's claim that an agency violated the ADA is relevant at the
TPR because the ADA prohibits discrimination by the state. The
parent's objection is with the manner in which the state has treated her
with respect to the evidence and the decision at the TPR. The TPR may
be the only feasible time for her to raise such an objection. She is asking
that the TPR be denied because it is based on inadequate evidence, and
not because this is a "remedy" for the state's violation of the ADA. A
remedy for the state's violation of her rights and the rights of all disabled
respondent parents can be litigated separately in federal court.
Although New York and other states have been reluctant to allow
parents to raise ADA violations at TPRs, the reasoning of these courts is
in conflict with the legislative intent and the plain language of the ADA.
States should follow the Supreme Court and federal courts' ~road
interpretation of Title II; parents should not be barred from asserting that
the ADA guarantees certain rights, and that any violation of these rights
is relevant in deciding whether to grant the TPR.
D. BRINGING AN ADA-TPR CLAIM IN FEDERAL COURT
1. Prima Facie Case
A parent can file an ADA case in federal court, raising a claim of
discrimination based on disability at any time during her interaction with
an agency - after the initial neglect or abuse filing; between permanency
hearings; while a TPR is pending; after a state court has terminated
rights, regardless of whether the ADA was raised; or pending an appeal
of the TPR - but the focus here is a potential ADA claim after a TPR. 113
111

Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified as amendments to
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
112
42 U.S.C. § 675(5). ASFA's 15 out of22 month timeline has been adopted in
almost every state, infra note 312.
113
State and federal courts appear to have concurrent jurisdiction over matters
that relate to parental rights and the ADA. See Theresa Glennon, Lawyering for
the Mentally Ill: Walking with Them: Advocating for Parents with Mental
Illnesses in the Child Welfare System, 12 TEMP. POL. & C!v. RTS. L. REv. 273,

132

Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law

[Vol. 15:1

The parent will have to prove three things: that the agency is a public
entity; that she is a qualified individual with a disability; and that she has
been subjected to discrimination on the basis of this disability. 114
The first prong is easy. As discussed, any state or municipal agency,
including a contract private agency, is a public entity. 115 To fulfill the
second prong, a parent must demonstrate that she has a "mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities ... ;
or a record of such impairment; or of being regarded as having such an
116
impairment."
The first definition may be difficult for a parent to
prove if her mental illness is managed; 117 however, mental disability
claims in other contexts have survived this test. 118 It probably is not in a
parent's interest to claim that parenting is a life activity substantially
limited by her mental disability, because this might undercut her
argument that she is a fit parent or fit for services (even if this should be
irrelevant, as discussed below). A parent also can demonstrate a record
of impairment or of being regarded as having an impairment by
admitting into evidence the initial allegations, the finding, or the
subsequent case record. 119

300 (2003); see also Mclnnes-Mesnor v. Maine Medical Center, 211 F. Supp.
2d 256, 263 (D. Me. 2002), aff'd 319 F.3d 63 (I st Cir. 2003); Black v. Dep't of
Mental Health, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 39, 42 n.4 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 2000); but see
McLeod v. State of Maine Dep't of Human Servs., No. 99-233-P-H, 1999 WL
33117123 at *2 (D. Me. Nov. 2, 1999).
114
See Cary LaCheen, Using Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act on
Behalf of Clients in TANF Programs, 8 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POLY 1, 3947 (2001).
115
See 28 CFR § 35.130(b)(l).
116
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C).
117
See Ryan v. Grae & Rybicki, P.C., 135 F.3d 867, 872 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding
no substantial limitation where impairment limited plaintiffs ability "only
periodically"); Swanson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 268 F.3d 307, 315-317 (6th Cir.
2001) (periodic mental illness with successful treatment is not disability).
118
Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 113 F. Supp. 2d 770, 773 (E.D. Pa. 2000)
(prima facie case made out for plaintiff by a showing that "he or she (1) has a
disability (2) is a qualified individual and (3) has suffered an adverse
employment action because of that disability"); Amir v. St. Louis Univ., 184
F.3d 1017, 1027-28 (8th Cir. 1999) (summary judgment denied to defendant
where plaintiff was a medical student and suffered from Obsessive Compulsive
Disorder).
119
See, e.g., case cited supra note 41; cases cited infra note 227.
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In addition, the second prong of the prima facie case requires that the
parent prove she is "eligible" for a benefit offered by the state. The
benefit pertaining to TPRs is reunification services. 120 Although only a
few ADA-TPR cases have been litigated in federal court, mentally
disabled parents have had difficulty demonstrating that they are eligible
for reunification services under the ADA. 121 States have argued that
certain parents are not "qualified" to be parents, and therefore not
entitled to these services. 122 One district court dismissed a mentally ill
parent's ADA claim, after a New York family court had made a neglect
finding and granted a termination of parental rights, because "the Family
Court has ruled, and it is not within the authority of this Court to
question that ruling, that plaintiff is not qualified to act as a parent to her
children." 123 Apparently, the federal court was reluctant to question the
substance of the family court's rulings, even if they were inherently
intertwined with the ADA claim. 124
Even aside from the relationship between TPRs and the ADA, the
claim that certain parents are not "qualified" under the ADA fails
because all states provide preventive 125 and/or reunification 126 services to
120

Reunification services are provided and/or coordinated by the agency and
facilitate the reunification of a family when a child has been placed in foster
care. They can include parenting classes, individual and/or family therapy,
education, employment and housing assistance, and programs addressing
domestic violence, substance abuse, anger management, etc. as appropriate. See,
e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 1055(c), 1089(d)(2)(viii)(F) (2007); S.C. CODE
ANNOT. § 20-7-764(B)(3) (2006); see also Appendix B.
121
McLeod, 1999 WL 33117123 at *1-2 (granting defendant's motion to
dismiss on grounds that a federal court, pursuant to the Younger doctrine, "must
abstain from hearing a case over which it has jurisdiction so long as there is (1)
an ongoing state judicial proceeding that (2) implicates an important state
interest and (3) provides an adequate opportunity for the plaintiff to raise the
claims advanced in [her] federal lawsuit"); Morrison v. Comrn'r of Special
Servs., No. CV 94-5796 RID, 1996 WL 684426 (E.D.N.Y. Nov., 18, 1996);
Bartell v. Lohiser, 215 F.3d 550 (6th Cir. 2000).
122
Morrison, 1996 WL 684426, at *4.
123 Id.
124
See supra text accompanying note 59.
125
Preventive services are designed to avoid removing the child from his home
and placing him in state custody. New York's Social Services Law defines such
services as "supportive and rehabilitative services provided ... to children and
their families for the purpose of: averting an impairment or disruption of a
family which will or could result in the placement of a child in foster care;
enabling a child who has been placed in foster care to return to his family at an
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parents, at some stage during the course of a child protective case. 127
States provide these services not to bolster already "qualified" parents,
but because there is a state and national interest in preserving families,
particularly ones at risk, 128 and because biological parents have certain
fundamental rights. 129 The Supreme Court has long held that parenting
earlier time than would otherwise be possible; or reducing the likelihood that a
child who has been discharged from foster care would return to such care."
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 409 (McKinney 2003). See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
18B, § 3(A)(l) (2002); FLA. STAT. § 39.402(7) (West Supp. 2007); CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE § 11400(1) (West 2001) (amended 2007).
126
Supra notes 120 and 125.
127
Federal legislation, such as AACWA and ASFA, specifically provide that
reasonable efforts must be made before removing children from their biological
parents. See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-272, § 47l(a)(15)(A), 94 Stat. 501, 503; Adoption and Safe Families Act of
1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111Stat.2116, 2116 §101(a)(15)(B)(i). Reasonable
efforts must also be made after a child has been removed in order to reunify the
family. See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act § 471(a)(15)(B);
Adoption and Safe Families Act §10l(a)(15)(B)(ii). New York's child
protective statutes, like all states', provide the same. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§ 1015-a (McKinney 1999); § 1022(a)(iii)-(iv), (c) (McKinney Supp. 2007);
§ 1027(b)(i) (McKinney Supp. 2007); § 1089(d)(2)(viii)(F) (McKinney Supp.
2007); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 409 (McKinney 2003). But see Appendix A for
New York and other state statutes under which mentally disabled parents are not
always entitled to services after a child has been removed.
128
See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW. § 384-b(l)(a)(iii) (McKinney Supp. 2007)
("the state's first obligation is to help the family with services to prevent its
break-up or reunite it ifthe child has already left home"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 207-764(B)(l)(b) (West. Supp. 2006) ("[t]he [child protection] plan must be
oriented to correcting [the] problems and circumstances [of the family] in the
shortest possible time in order to expedite the child's return to the home"); PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6302 (West 2001) (a purpose of child protective law is to
"stabilize and protect the integrity of family life."). Also, New York, like all
other states, puts reunification as the automatic goal upon the initial filing of a
child protective case. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1015-a; § 1022(a)(iii)-(iv), (c);
§ 1027(b)(i); § 1089(c)(4)(i).
129
S~e Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745 ( 1982). According to the Santosky Court, "the fundamental liberty interest
of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not
evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost
temporary custody of their child to the state." Id. at 753. See also Lassiter v.
Dep't of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) ("A parent's interest in the
accuracy and injustice of the decision to terminate his or her parental rights is a
commanding one").
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is a fundamental right, though the state may intervene under the doctrine
of parens patriae to protect the interest of a child, subject to legal
safeguards for parents. 130 Indeed, it is illegal under the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA), ASFA, and state
law for states to remove children before making "reasonable efforts" to
preserve the family. 131 It also is a violation of the ADA to provide
services to some parents and not others. In any event, it is a parent's
inabilities which "qualify" her for services, not her abilities.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that for the purposes of the
ADA, qualified individuals include those who are not receiving services
voluntarily. 132 This category should include parents who are ordered to
comply with programs, as invariably occurs after a case has been filed whether at a pre-fact-finding hearing, at the disposition, or at a
permanency hearing.
The third prong of the prima facie case can be met by showing
intentional or unintentional discrimination. A parent could attempt to
prove that she did not receive assistance because of unfounded beliefs
about her disability and its effect on parenting. Tanya, for example, had
raised Gaby until the age of two, and the only neglect finding against her
was of excessive corporal punishment, identical to that of countless nondisabled parents who are eventually reunified with their children. 133 Yet
130

States have the discretion to construct and implement termination of parental
rights statutes, but Stanley requires that a state make an "individual inquiry" into
the fitness of the parent, not based on status, 405 U.S. at 645, and Santosky
requires that termination be proved by "clear and convincing evidence", 455
U.S. at 746.
131
See Adoption and Safe Family Act§ 101(a)(15)(b)(i); Adoption Assistance
and Child Welfare Act§ 47l(a)(15)(A); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 11400(1)
(2007); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 39.402(7) (2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 188,
§ 3(a)(l) (2007); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§§ 358(2)(a), 409 (2006).
132
Yeskey, 118 F.3d at 173.
133
According to statistics from the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services' Administration for Children and Families, in 2005, 70,878 children in
New York were the subjects of substantiated reports of maltreatment, including
excessive corporal punishment. JOHN A. GAUDIOSI, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERV., CHILD MAL TREAMENT 39 (2005), available at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm05/cm05.pdf. According to the
Child Welfare League of America, 65% of the children in foster care in 2001
were reunited with their biological families. Child Welfare League of America,
New York's Children 2004, http://www.cwla.org/advocacy/statefactsheets/
2004/newyork.pdf (last visited November 6, 2007).
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Tanya's caseworker, perhaps based on what appeared to be a disbelief of
Tanya's potential parenting capabilities, made little effort to reunite
Tanya and Gaby. Such biased treatment by the agency is all too
common for mentally disabled parents. 134
In the alternative, a parent could prove that she was unintentionally
discriminated against by making a disparate impact claim. 135 When state
law mandates services to non-disabled parents but not disabled ones, as
in New York, 136 the law has a disparate impact. A disparate impact
argument could also be made where services to disabled, but not nondisabled, parents have been cut because of budget constraints. 137
A parent also can claim that she was discriminated against because
the state did not adapt its reunification services to her needs, thereby
denying her the benefits of public "services . . ., programs or
activities." 138 The ADA requires that "a public entity . . . make
reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the
modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of
disability." 139 Parenting skills classes or housing assistance that are not
tailored to a parent's mental disability are unproductive and therefore
essentially a denial of benefits. 140
Reasonable modifications should include integration into the
community wherever possible. In Olmstead v. L.C., the Supreme Court
found an ADA violation where the state did not provide communitybased treatment for mentally disabled individuals who were deemed
qualified under the state's professional evaluation. 141 The Court held
that institutionalization is a form of discrimination because it
"perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated are
incapable or unworthy of participating in community life," and that
134

See cases cited infra notes 346-48.
Theresa Glennon, Walking with Them: Advocating for Parents with Mental
Illnesses in the Child Welfare System, 12 TEMP. POL. & Crv. RTS. L. REV. 273,
305 (2003). A disparate impact claim under the ADA could be made where a
state fails to provide meaningful access to a benefit that non-disabled
individuals receive. Id.
136
See infra note 219.
137
See Glennon, supra note 135, at 306.
138
42 U.S.C. § 12131.
139
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2007).
140
See Glennon, supra note 135, at 296, 307.
141
527 U.S. 581.
135
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"confinement in an institution severely diminishes the everyday life
activities of individuals, including family relations." 142
In the context of parenting, the Third Circuit held in Helen L. v.
Diario 143 that the state had violated the ADA by not providing in-home
services to a mother of two who used a wheelchair and required
"assistance with certain activities of daily living." This failure to
provide services forced the woman to live in a nursing home separate
from her children. While this holding is not specific to mentally
disabled parents, it serves as strong precedent in support of assisted
living for parents residing with their children in community-based
settings. Such plans would serve as an alternative to institutionalization
of mentally disabled parents and foster care for their children. As
previously noted, there are numerous supportive housing programs in
New York, 144 as well as around the country, 145 for mentally disabled
parents to live with their children.
Similarly, in Henrietta D. v. Guiliani, a district court found an ADA
violation where New York City had not provided intensive case
management services to individuals with AIDS. 146 The court held that it
was necessary and reasonable for the City to maintain a single service
center where individuals with AIDS could seek housing, medical, and
financial assistance. It can be argued that the special needs of people
with AIDS are parallel to those of mentally disabled parents, who must
navigate the complex and intimidating child welfare system. 147 It would
be reasonable, then, for the state to specially train certain caseworkers to
work with mentally disabled parents and refer them for services tailored
to their needs. Moreover, since child welfare cases already have multiple
142

Id. at 600-01.
46 F.3d at 328.
144
Supra note 100.
145
Many states have housing programs that enable mentally disabled parents to
live with their children. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development's Section 811 Supportive Housing for Persons with Disabilities
program is one such program. See, e.g., Iowa City Housing Information,
http://www.jeonet.com/city/planning/ichi/iiid.htm (last visited November 5,
2007); New York State Campaign for Mental Health Housing,
http://www.campaign4housing.org/members.html (last visited November 5,
2007); West Central Illinois Continuum of Care,
http://www.wciccc.com/HousingDirectory/ (last visited November 5, 2007).
146
119 F. Supp. 2d 181.
147
See Glennon, supra note 135, at 307.
143
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levels of caseworkers, 148 specialized caseworkers should not be
considered a fundamental alteration 149 to the state's program (the
fundamental alteration defense is explored below).

2. State Defenses
There are three defenses to the ADA: that the state does not have to
make fundamental alterations to its programs in order to serve a disabled
person, 150 that it does not have to serve someone who poses a direct
threat, 151 and that the state is immune to suit by private citizens. 152
i. Fundamental Alterations
Title II permits an exception to the "no discrimination" requirements
if doing so would "fundamentally alter" the nature of the program or
service at issue. 153 Title III explicitly includes an "undue burden"
defense, which also has been applied to Title II defendants. 154 The
ADA's regulations specify several factors to consider in an "undue
burden" claim, including the nature and cost of the proposed alteration,
the overall financial resources of the agency, and the type of work the
agency performs. 155

148

In New York City, for example, most child welfare cases are handled by two
casework teams, one at ACS and one at the contract agency. ACS assigns a
"case manager," who reports to multiple levels of supervisors, and the contract
agency assigns a caseworker who also reports to multiple levels of supervisors.
See
http://www.nyc.gov/html/acs/downloads/pdf/ioc_initiative_org_chart.pdf
for an organzational chart of the executive management of ACS; the Deputy
Commissioner of Family Permanency Services oversees the Executive Director
of Case Management, who supervisers the case managers, who monitor the
"provider" agencies. For an example of the levels of supervision at a contract
agency, see http://www.essnyc.org/staff.html. Regardless of the structure, all
child welfare cases in all states have at least one caseworker and one supervisor.
See also Glennon, supra note 135, at 307.
149
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2007).
150
§ 35.130(b)(7).
151
§ 36.208.
152
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
153
§ 35.130(b)(7).
154
See, e.g., Helen L., 46 F.3d at 338.
155
28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2007).
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In Olmstead v. L.C., the Supreme Court followed this balancing test
by holding that "in evaluating a State's fundamental-alteration defense,
the . . . Court must consider, in view of the resources available to the
State, not only the cost of the providing ... care to the litigants, but also
the range of services the State provides others with mental disabilities,
and the State's obligation to mete out those services equitably." 156 A
New York court applied the balancing test in Sanon v. Wing, which held
that the state had to continue providing home health care to plaintiffs
through its Medicaid program instead of placing them in a nursing home
because the state had not shown that the cost of home care was
unreasonable with respect to the system as a whole. 157
States can argue that providing services to mentally disabled parents,
such as long term therapy, constitutes a fundamental alteration of its
foster care program because they are unreasonably expensive. These
costs, then, must be weighed against those incurred when a child remains
in foster care, both before and after a termination of parental rights. 158 In
New York, as in the rest of the country, most children remain in foster
care after the TPR for a substantial length of time while an adoptive
home is sought and finalized; 159 even if the child is adopted (which is not
always the case), 160 the state often continues to bear the cost of foster
care through adoption subsidies, which are paid until the child is 18 (and
21 in some states, including New York 161 ). In fact, it has been shown
that some of the most expensive reunification services can actually save
states money in the long run, because many services, such as 24-hour
attendant care, are not necessary as the child gets older or the parent's
156

527 U.S. at 597.
2000 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 139 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000).
158
See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 597.
159
See Leslie Kaufman, New York Acts To Ease Process In Foster Care, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 22, 2007, at Bl (stating that, in 2006, the average length of stay in
foster care for a child in New York City was 58 months); see also U.S. DEPT. OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, ADOPTION
AND FOSTER CARE ANALYSIS SYSTEM REPORT (2000),
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats_research/afcars/statistics/tpr_ tbl4_ 20
05.htm and http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats_research/afcars/tar/report
13.htm (stating that, in New York, the mean length of time between TPR and
adoption in 2005 was 19.03 months and that the national mean length of time in
2005 was 27 months); see also infra notes 311 & 313.
160
See infra notes 311, 313, 315-17, & 319.
161
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 451(1) (2007).
157
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capabilities increase. 162 The initial cost of the services is offset by future
savings, when the child is no longer in foster care. The question of an
"undue financial burden" is a fact-specific inquiry; under the ADA, there
is no justification for a total absence of services for mentally disabled
parents when non-disabled parents are entitled to these services,
especially since parents have a fundamental interest in retaining their
parental rights. 163 The cost of reunification services would have to be
astronomically and universally high in order for states to justify
depriving all mentally disabled parents of the potential to be reunified
with their children. Such an outcome is not supported by the facts.
States also can claim that because the ADA's regulations specifically
exclude "personal services," 164 they therefore are excused from
providing services such as 24-hour attendant care to mentally disabled
parents. This regulatory language should be read as clarifying that the
ADA does not create a requirement that a public entity provide personal
services. However, if a right to personal services exists through another
law or practice, the ADA mandates that this be implemented in a nondiscriminatory way. 165 For example, New York requires "diligent
efforts" 166 for reunifying non-disabled parents with their children, which
may entail a variety of services (including "personal services" such as
homemakers 167). Disabled parents are entitled to services that have the
same potential, with or without reasonable modification, for facilitating
reunification.
As mentioned, in Tanya's case, the additional services that she
required are not extremely costly. The essential components (more
intensive casework services and prompt housing referrals) have little or
no cost, and the other aspects, such as homemaker services, substance
abuse counseling, and job assistance, are the same or similar to what
162

See Jay Mathews, Custody Battle: The Disabled Fight to Raise Their
Children, WASH. POST., Aug. 18, 1992, at ZlO (describing Santa Clara County,
California program that reported a $1. 72 savings for every dollar spent on
intensive family reunification services).
163
See supra notes 129-30.
164
28 C.F.R. § 35.135 (2007).
165
42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006); 28 CFR § 35.130(b)(7) (2007).
166
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 384-b(7)(t)(3) (McKinney 2007).
167
Non-disabled parents often are given homemakers/housekeepers and other
in-home assistance. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 423.2(b)(5)
(2007).
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non-disabled parents receive. Regardless, these costs certainly did not
outweigh Tanya's interest in regaining custody of her daughter; in fact, it
had appeared for the first few years of the case, despite the lack of effort
by the caseworker, that mother and daughter would be reunified (Tanya
was visiting regularly, maintaining housing with her brother, and had not
had any acute schizophrenic episodes). A state's potential savings
through reunification of a family, rather than bearing the cost of
maintaining a child in foster care, has been documented in similar
cases. 168
ii. Direct Threat
States also could argue that requiring services for mentally disabled
parents poses a "direct threat" to the safety of their children. 169 Title III
includes a defense to a "direct threat," when the service or
accommodation poses a "significant risk to the health or safety of others
that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies . . . ." 170
Although Title II does not explicitly include the "direct threat" defense,
it could be argued that a disabled person does not meet the "essential
eligibility requirements for the receipt of services" 171 if the receipt of
those services poses a direct threat to a third person (in this case, a
child). 172

168

Supra note 162.
While states have not raised this issue directly in the few federal ADA-TPR
cases that have been litigated, supra note 118, or in the state cases where the
ADA has been raised, see, e.g., supra notes 41 and 43, agencies generally argue
that mentally disabled parents pose a danger or are a direct threat to their
children. See, e.g., In re B.J.F., 623 S.E.2d 547 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005); In re
E.M.M.W, No. 01-0726, 2002 WL 987947 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002); In re John D.,
934 P.2d 308 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (holding the ADA inapplicable because the
ground for the TPR was abandonment, and the state had no obligation to
provide services to any parent when alleging abandonment).
170
28 C.F.R. § 36.208 (2007).
171
42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2007).
172
This approach was first articulated in Arline, 480 U.S. 273, in which a
teacher was dismissed because she was infected with tuberculosis. The court
found that she did not meet the requirements for protection under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 because she might constitute a threat to her students.
The Rehabilitation Act was the precursor to the ADA and the standards from
this case were incorporated into the regulations implementing the "direct threat"
defense in Title III.
169
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However, the "direct threat" argument is without merit because the
AACW A and AFSA mandate "reasonable efforts" to reunify families
except when a court determines that one of three specific situations
exists: if the parent has subjected the child to severe and repeated abuse;
if the parent has committed, attempted to commit, or aided in the murder
or involuntary manslaughter of one of his or her children, or has
committed a felony assault resulting in serious bodily harm to one of his
or her children; or if the parent's rights to another child have been
terminated involuntarily. 173 This mandate has been adopted in the child
protective statutes of each state. 174 The plain language of the federal
statutes indicates that these were the only circumstances Congress
established as a presumptive threat. 175 By the time a parent is eligible
for "reasonable" efforts, any other "threat" has been eliminated by virtue
of the fact that the child already has been removed from the parent's
care.1 76 If the state thinks that a parent's mental illness constitutes a
direct threat that cannot be ameliorated, it will have to prove this threat
by clear and convincing evidence during the TPR. 177 As discussed, it is
impossible for a state to meet this standard, in light of the ADA, without
an inquiry involving evidence from some provision of services. 178
In Tanya's case, she clearly did not constitute a direct threat to
Gaby, as the caseworker never reported any inappropriate behavior
toward her during the supervised visits, or any suspicion of such for the
short time \\'.hen visits were unsupervised. Similarly successful visits are
common for mentally disabled parents and their children, according to
casework notes, 179 suggesting that the direct threat concern often may be
overstated.

173

42 U.S.C. § 67l(a)(15)(B) (2007).
New York delineates the exceptions for reasonable efforts. N.Y. FAM. CT.
ACT § 1039-b (McKinney 2007). See Appendix B for the reasonable efforts
statutes of each state.
175
42 U.S.C. § 67l(a)(15)(B) (2007).
176
Under all TPR statutes, a child must first be removed from the respondent's
home and placed in foster care (and usually must spend at least 15 months in
foster care) before a TPR can be filed. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 384-b
(McKinney 2007). See also Appendix C (addressing the grounds for TPR
statutes of each state).
177
See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 384-b; Appendix C; supra note 130.
178
See, e.g., cases cited supra note 59.
179
See cases cited infra notes 346-349, 351-353 & 355.
174
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iii. Sovereign Immunity
Another obstacle to a parent's federal claim 1s state sovereign
Although local
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. 180
government and contract agencies are not immune, any action contesting
a TPR also will involve the state because TPRs are governed by state
child welfare laws and state court decisions. A parent's primary goal in
filing an ADA claim after a TPR likely will be injunctive relief, seeking
to reinstate her rights and remand the case to family court. 181 However,
if a court finds that the state is immune in a particular case, it will be
protected from all forms of relief, whether monetary, injunctive, or
. .
182
pumttve.
The status of immunity and Title II is murky at this point. Title IV
of the ADA specifically revokes state sovereign immunity, 183 and
Congress invoked the Fourteenth Amendment as the source of its
authority to enact the ADA, 184 but this revocation has been partially
invalidated by Supreme and circuit court jurisprudence as it applies to
Title II. 185 In Board of Trustees of the University ofAlabama v. Garrett,
the Supreme Court determined that states could not be sued for monetary
damages under Title I of the ADA, but specifically declined to address
whether the same applied for Title II. 186 In 2006, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in U.S. v. Georgia to consider whether Title II validly
abrogates sovereign immunity, but then did not squarely address the
issue. 187 The Court held only that Title II validly abrogates state
180

U.S. CONST. amend. XL ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State").
181
42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2000). This section also provides for compensatory
damages for successful claimants.
182
The Eleventh Amendment on its face applies equally to suits in law and
equity. The Supreme Court stated, in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, that "the relief
sought by a plaintiff suing a State is irrelevant to the question of whether the
suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment . . . [and] whether Congress has
power to abrogate States' immunity." 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996).
183
42 U.S.C. § 12202 (2000).
184
§ 12101(b)(4).
185
United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006); see cases cited infra notes
189 & 197-98.
186
531 U.S. 356, 360 n.1 (2001).
187
546 U.S. 151.
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sovereign immunity when it proscribes conduct that actually violates the
Fourteenth Amendment; it left to the lower courts to determine, on a
case-by-case basis, the more difficult question of whether conduct that
violates Title II but does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment is still
valid under Congress' Section 5 enforcement power under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 188 To be valid under Section 5, the remedy
proscribed by Congress must be congruent and proportional to specific
findings of a pattern of state constitutional violations. 189
In a TPR-ADA claim, a parent must prove either that her Fourteenth
Amendment rights were violated, or that the state's conduct is actionable
because it is legitimately prohibited by Congress under Section 5. 190 It
would be difficult to demonstrate that a parent's Fourteenth Amendment
rights have been violated because the disabled are not a suspect class,
and the state only has to show that it has a rational basis for treating
disabled parents differently than non-disabled ones to maintain its
sovereign immunity. 191
However, a Section 5 argument is easier to make because the
Supreme Court, applying the Section 5 test, has found that Congress
validly abrogated state sovereign immunity in cases involving the right
of access to courts. 192 According to the Court in Tennessee v. Lane,
access to courts is a fundamental right, stemming from the constitutional
guarantees under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 193 The Supreme Court also has held that parental rights
derive from Due Process: "a parent's interests in the nurture, upbringing,
companionship, care and custody of children are generally protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 194 Therefore, in
an ADA case, a parent could argue that being denied services outright or
services that are tailored to her disability is a violation of two sets of
fundamental rights: those of a parent and those of a person trying to
access the courts. And these rights intersect; a parent's ability to

188

Id. at 159.
See Lane, 541 U.S. 509; City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997);
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365.
190
Supra note 189.
191
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 432.
192
Lane, 541 U.S. 509.
193
Id. at 533-34.
194
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 77 (2000).
189
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complete reunification services is inherently linked to the evidence used
in TPR proceedings. 195
The counter-argument is that Lane involved physical access to courts
and not the more nuanced issue of evidence. But a parent's case will be
bolstered if she can also prove a pattern of discrimination based on her
disability. In Lane, the Supreme Court noted that "the unequal treatment
of disabled persons in the administration of judicial services has a long
history," which justifies prophylactic measures by Congress. 196 If, as in
Lane, a court finds that a state's treatment of a disabled parent reflects
that which Congress intended to prevent, and that Title II is an
appropriate remedy, then Section 5 should apply (and state sovereign
immunity will be validly abrogated).
It is unclear, however, how this argument would be received by a
circuit court, as the courts are divided in their interpretations of the Lane
holding. 197 In New York, the Second Circuit denied a Title II claim in
the context of public education, finding that there was no fundamental
right of access to post-secondary education for the disabled. 198
However, a respondent parent's case may be distinguishable because
both parental rights and the right of access to courts are fundamental,
though no circuit court has yet to be confronted with this overlap. 199
195

Supra note 59.
Lane, 541 U.S. at 531.
197
See Sacca v. Buffalo State Coll., No. Ol-CV-881A, 2004 WL 2095458, at *3
(W.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2004); Johnson v. S.C. State Univ., No. CIVA3:02-CV2065(CFD), 2004 WL 2377225, at *4 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2004); see also
Constantine v. Rectors of Geo. Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 490 (4th Cir. 2005);
Ass'n for Disabled Am., Inc. v. Fla. Int'l. Univ., 405 F.3d. 954, 958-59 (11th
Cir. 2005); Roe v. Johnson, 334 F. Supp. 2d 415, 421 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). But
see Pace v. Bogalusa City Sch. Bd., 403 F.3d 272, 287 (5th Cir. 2005)
(declining to address whether the holding in Lane extends to disability
discrimination in addition to public education).
198
Press v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Stony Brook, 388 F. Supp. 2d 127, 135
(E.D.N.Y. 2005).
199
There have been ADA-TPR cases in federal courts, but none has reached the
circuit court level with an argument based on two sets of fundamental rights.
See Bartell v. Lohiser, 215 F.3d 550 (6th Cir. 2000), aff'g, 12 F.Supp. 2d 640
(E.D. Mich. 1998) (holding that the state did not violate the mother's
constitutional right to raise her child because the state's interest in the child was
greater than the mother's; the issue of the fundamental right to court access was
not raised); McLeod, 1999 WL 33117123; Morrison, 1996 WL 684426.
196
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Even if a court finds that the state is immune, a parent still may be
able to seek injunctive relief under Ex parte Young, which provides an
exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity. 200 In order to qualify
under Ex parte Young, the injunctive relief must end a continuing
violation of federal law by a state employee acting in his official
capacity. 201 The applicability of Ex parte Young has been upheld in
ADA cases. 202 The Supreme Court also has stated that an Ex parte
Young exception would be valid in Title I claims, 203 although the Court
has not yet addressed this question addressed with respect to Title 11. 204
E. FILING AN ADA GRIEVANCE

Aside from pursuing a federal case, a parent could file an ADA
complaint with the local "ADA coordinator," according to federal
regulation. 205 Implementation of this regulation varies nationally, but the
ADA coordinator is generally an employee of a state or county who
oversees ADA compliance among public and contract agencies. 206
However, judging by New York City, this procedure is, at best,
underutilized and unfamiliar to respondent parents. According to New
York City's government website, the City has an ADA coordinator; 207
200

209 U.S. 123 (1908).
Id. at 159.
202
See, e.g., Koslow v. Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161, 179 (3d Cir. 2002).
203
See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9.
204
Ruth Colker & Adam Milani, The Post-Garrett World: Insufficient State
Protection Against Disability Discrimination, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1075, 1080 n.13
(2002) (noting that although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the
question of whether Ex parte Young applies to Title II, federal courts have
permitted Title II claims made solely for injunctive relief to go forward under
the doctrine).
205
28 C.F.R. § 35. l 07(a) (2007) ("A public entity that employs 50 or more
persons shall designate at least one employee to coordinate its efforts to comply
with and carry out its responsibilities under [Part 35, Non Discrimination on the
Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services], including any
investigation of any complaint communicated to it alleging its noncompliance
with this part or alleging any actions that would be prohibited by this part. The
public entity shall make available to all interested individuals the name, office
address, and telephone number of the employee or employees designated
pursuant to this paragraph").
206 Id.
207
Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings, http://www.nyc.gov/oath;
http://nyc.gov/html/oath/html/ada_grievances.html. (last visited Oct. 31, 2007).
According to the website and two phone calls placed to the Office of
201
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however, the person named on the website does not appear to know that
ADA coordination is one of her job responsibilities. 208 Moreover, even
if this person is capable of acting as New York City's ADA coordinator,
she never surfaces in child protection proceedings and no one informs
respondent parents that an ADA coordinator is supposed to be
available. 209 But filing a complaint with an ADA coordinator could be a
potential avenue for advocacy, at least outside of New York City.
Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH) by my research assistant (8/2/07;
8/6/07), the person designated in New York City is Cherron Howard-Williams.
Telephone interview (Aug. 2 and 6, 2007). A search on New York State
government's website, http://www.ny.gov, for the "Americans with Disabilitlies
Act" results in various document intended to help businesses and other facilities
comply with the ADA. The only document of relevance to an individual with a
claim is a health care complaint form, but there is no accompanying or
explanatory text. The search also leads to the New York City Mayor's Office
for People with Disabilites, which in turn links to the DOJ's ADA website,
http://www.ada.gov (searches conducted 8/9/07 and 8/10/07).
208
My research assistant called the OATH office twice. The first time he asked
for the Americans with Disabilities Act coordinator, and was connected to
Cherron Howard-Williams. Ms. Howard-Williams, however, stated that she is
not the ADA coordinator, but works with disciplining government employees
when they make mistakes. She stated that she did not know who the ADA
coordinator is and did not have any suggestions for how to find that person.
Telephone interview (Aug. 2, 2007). On the second phone call to OATH, the
research assistant again asked the operator for the person who coordinates or
works with the Americans with Disabilities Act, or the ADA. The research
assistant was again connected to Cherron Howard-Williams. This time, Ms.
Howard-Williams reiterated that she does not work with the Americans with
Disabilities Act in any capacity and, furthermore, has never been involved in
any child protective matter in any capacity in New York City. Telephone
interview (Aug. 6, 2007). A search on New York State government's website
(www.ny.gov) for the "Americans with Disabilities Act" results in various
document intended to help businesses and other facilities comply with the ADA.
The only document of relevance to an individual with a claim is a health care
complaint form, but there is no accompanying or explanatory text; for more
information on the ADA, the website links to the DOJ's ADA website
(http://www.ada.gov). New York State, http://www.ny.gov (search "Americans
with Disabilities Act") (last visited Aug. 9 and 10, 2007).
209
Having represented hundreds of children in New York City and Nassau
County Family Courts from 2002 to the present, I have no knowledge of an
ADA coordinator ever appearing in Family Court, nor do the numerous
colleagues with whom I work on a daily basis. In addition, no parent or parent's
attorney with whom I have spoken has indicated that they ever were informed of
an ADA coordinator.
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A parent could also file a claim within 180 days of the
discriminatory act with the Department of Justice (DOJ) or with the
federal agency that is "most closely associated with the activity of the
state or local govemment" 210 (in this case, the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, Region
2).211

There is no penalty for filing with the wrong agency, and a complaint
can always be filed with the Department of Justice, as long as it is within
the 180-day period. The federal agency has authority to investigate the
complaint. It may attempt to resolve the problem informally. If informal
resolution fails ... it may issue a letter of findings. 212
If the situation still is not ameliorated, the federal agency may
exercise its authority to sue the state or local government for the
violation. 213 But again, the procedure for filing a claim with the local
federal agency (the Administration for Children and Families) or with
the Department of Justice in New York State is unknown to respondent
parents, and, to my knowledge, has never been used in the State. 214
210

ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH
MENTAL DISABILITIES 177 (Norman Dorsen ed., S. Ill. Univ. Press 1996).
211
ACF Region 2, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/region2/index.html (last
visited Oct. 31, 2007).
212
LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 210, at 177.
213 Id.
214
My research assistant placed three phone calls to the federal Administration
for Children and Families, Region 2. On the first two calls, the people
answering the phone expressed complete bewilderment over the question of
how to file an ADA claim and what a respondent parent could or should do in
this type of case. The research assistant was referred both times to New York
City's Administration for Children's Services (ACS) (the City's social services
agency). On the third phone call to the federal Administration for Children and
Families, the research assistant was told to call the Legal Aid Society and that a
parent would have to do the same. Telephone interviews (Aug. 1, 2, and 6,
2007). When a subsequent phone call to ACS's Parent's & Children's Rights
Hotline at the Office of Advocacy (information available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/acs/html/advocacy/office_ advocacy.shtml) was made
on August 7, 2007, the research assistant was told that the Office of Advocacy
has never handled, and would not handle, an ADA claim, and that a parent
would have to call the Legal Aid Society. The Office of Advocacy did not
mention that this would be impossible for nearly all of the parents whose
children are the subject of abuse and neglect proceedings in New York City,
because the children already are represented by Legal Aid. Legal Aid Society
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Furthermore, the DOJ has never sued a state or local government on
behalf of a parent in any jurisdiction in the country. 215
II. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND STATE CHILD
WELFARE LAW

A. SERVICES FOR MENTALLY DISABLED PARENTS

According to the Americans with Disabilities Act, "no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity .... " 216 Therefore, if a state
offers services to non-disabled parents, it should do the same for those
who are disabled. There is a strong argument that disabled parents are
"qualified" under the ADA for the services. Furthermore, the Adoption
and Safe Families Act (ASF A) requires state agencies to engage in
"reasonable efforts" to reunify all families. 217 Exceptions can only be
made when a court determines that one of three conditions exists. 218
State child protection laws, however, vary in their compliance with
the ADA and ASF A in equal access to services for parents. Appendix B
contains a chart of state laws regarding entitlement to reunification
services.

of New York, http://legal-aid.org/en/whatwedo/juvenilepractice.aspx (last
visited Nov. 7, 2007) (stating that 90% of subject children in New York City are
represented by Legal Aid). A respondent parent cannot be represented by Legal
Aid if the firm already represents one or more of their children, because this
creates a conflict of interest. In order to contact the DOJ, a respondent parent
would have to be aware of the ADA, the DOJ, and the possibility of this type of
advocacy. Based on the above phone calls, my five years of work in New York
City and Nassau County Family Courts, and the search described infra note 215,
it is highly unlikely that a parent ever would have such an awareness.
215
According to the most comprehensive search of cases available from the
Department of Justice's ADA Enforcement website,
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/enforce.htm (covering April 1994 to June 2006).
216
42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2007).
217
Adoption and Safe Families Act, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997)
(codified as amended to scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
218
42 U.S.C. § 67l(a)(l5)(B) (2007).
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1. States without Reunification Services Requirements

New York is the only state in which the court may terminate the
rights of a mentally disabled parent without proof that the agency
provided reunification services and without a prior court decision
allowing the agency to forego these services. 219 New York does require
child welfare agencies to engage in "diligent efforts," which involves
providing services, to reunify parents with their children before a court
can terminate rights on the basis of permanent neglect, severe abuse, or
repeated abuse. 220 And ASFA requires states to make reasonable efforts
toward reunification for all parents. 221 ASFA's exceptions to reasonable
efforts were codified in the New York law 222 for the "sole purpose" of
complying with ASF A, 223 and the two statutes are virtually identical. 224
Furthermore, New York County Family Court has held that in a
motion225 asking to dispense with reasonable efforts, the movant is
required to prove that one of the six conditions delineated in ASF A
exists. 226
However, in spite of the ADA, ASF A, and state law, New York
courts have continually held that agencies do not have to engage in any
"diligent" or "reasonable" efforts before a court may terminate parental
rights on the basis of mental illness. 227 According to the courts, the TPR
statute lacks a diligent efforts mandate for causes of action based on

219

N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 384-b (4)(c) (2007); infra notes 231-34.
Id. § 384-b (7)(a), (7)(t)(3), (8)(a)(iv), (8)(b )(iii).
221
Adoption and Safe Families Act, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997)
(codified as amended to scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
222
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT§ 1039-b (McKinney 2007).
223
In re Marino S., Jr., 693 N.Y.S.2d 822, 824 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1999). See also
In re Jordy 0., 696 N.Y.S.2d 654, 655 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1999).
224
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §1039-b(b)(l)-(6) (providing that severe and repeated
abuse of the subject child; murder/manslaughter or felony assault of the subject
child, or another child of the parent; and termination with regard to another
child are grounds for being excused from reasonable efforts).
225
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT§ 1039-b (McKinney 2007).
226
In re Marino S., Jr., 693 N.Y.S.2d at 833.
227
See Jn re Kyle F., 14 A.D.3d 822, 823 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); Jn re Michael
D., 306 A.D.2d 938, 938 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003); In re Harry K., 706 N.Y.S.2d
657, 657 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000); In re Juliana V., 671 N.Y.S.2d 105, 106 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1998); In re Belinda S., 592 N.Y.S.2d 372, 373 (N.Y. App. Div.
1993); In re Demetruis F., 575 N.Y.S.2d 552, 553 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
220
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mental disability or illness. 228 "The diligent efforts requirement in a
neglect proceeding is specifically required by statute. It is not, however,
required by statute in a proceeding [for mental illness], and we decline to
read such a requirement into the statute."229 However, to my knowledge,
no mentally disabled parent in New York has raised the ADA as the
basis for entitlement to "diligent" or "reasonable" efforts prior to
termination.
The treatment of mentally disabled parents under New York law is
indicative of discriminatory treatment around the country, 230 although
parents in other states are entitled to procedural safeguards. In Utah,
there is a statutory presumption against reunification services when the
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a "parent is suffering
from a mental illness of such magnitude that it renders the parent
incapable of utilizing reunification services."231 California's statute is
similar, but two medical health experts must provide the clear and
convincing evidence of the parent's mental disability. 232 Other states
have comparable standards, allowing courts to decide that a service plan
is unwarranted either because of the parent's mental disability, 233 or
because it is generally inconsistent with the child's best interests. 234
228
229
230

In re Jammie CC., 540 N.Y.S.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
Id.

See Susan Kerr, The Application of the Americans with Disabilities Act to the
Termination of the Parental Rights of Individuals with Mental Disabilities, 16 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 387, 412 (2000).
231
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78-3a-311(3)(d)(i)(B) (2007).
232
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 361.5(b)(2) (2007); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7827(c)
(2003).
233
ALASKA STAT.§ 47.10.086(c)(5) (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-846(B)(l)(b)
(2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 610.127(6) (2007).
234
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-604(1)(b)(I) (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ l 7a-l 12G)(2) (2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.8055(2)(b) (2006); GA. CODE
ANN. § 15-l l-55(d) (2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 22, § 4041(2)(A2)(2)(2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 29C (2007); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 260.012(a) (2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-609(4)(c) (2005); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 432B.393(2) (2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-28(A) (2007); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-507(b)(l) (2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1572(6)
(2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5515(d) (2006); W. VA. CODE ANN.§ 49-65(b)(6) (2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-309(c)(iii) (2007). See also In re
Amelia W., 772 A.2d 619, 622 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001) (finding that father would
not benefit from services); In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 642 A.2d
201, 210 (Md. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that agency is not required to provide
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New York, however, is alone in failing to require proof in court before
dispensing with reunification services. The only time an agency in New
Yark is required to engage in reasonable efforts with a mentally disabled
parent is before the initial removal of the child, and only if the court
considers it "appropriate."235 Once the child has been removed, and the
agency thinks the case is progressing toward TPR, it will not be
obligated to assist the parent further, since TPRs based on mental
disability do not require proof of diligent efforts. 236 The majority of
mental disability TPRs in New York result in termination judgments,
without such proof. 237
2. States with Reunification Services Requirements

The majority of states (thirty, as well as DC) statutorily require
services for all parents, including mentally disabled parents. 238 These
statutes only exclude services under the aggravated circumstances
delineated in ASF A. 239 Courts in these states usually uphold this right to
services for mentally disabled parents. 240 However, a statutory mandate
services where evidence overwhelmingly suggests that parent will .never be fit
again).
235
N.Y. FAM. CT. §§ 1022 (a)(iii), 1027(b)(ii), 1028(b) (McKinney 2005).
236
N.Y. Soc. SERV. § 384-b(4)(c) (McKinney 2007).
237
New York State Kids' Well-Being Indicators Clearinghouse, KWIC Indicator
Profile: Foster Care TPR Judgments - Terminated Judgments,
http://www.nyskwic.org/access_data/ind_profile.cfm ?subindicatorID=83
(stating that, in 2005, 59.1% of all TPRs in New York State, and 64.7% in New
York City, ended in terminated judgments). An even higher proportion of
mental disability TPRs end in terminated judgments. See, e.g., In re Peter GG,
33 A.D.3d 1104 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); In re Loretta C., 32 A.D.3d 764 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2006); In re Henry W., 31 A.D.3d 940 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); In re
Kyle F., 14 A.D.3d 822; In re Nina D., 6 A.D.3d 702 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); In
re Michael D., 306 A.D.2d 938; In re Lisa Marie S., 304 A.D.2d 762 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2003). Compare In re Robert M. P. -D., 31 A.D.3d 560 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2006) (holding that rights are not terminated where petitioner only
introduced the forensic reports of a psychologist without having him testify); In
re Lina Catalina R., 21 A.D.3d 563 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (finding mentally
disabled parent's rights not terminated where court-appointed psychologist
stated that she did not have reasonable degree of certainty as to the foreseeable
future).
238
See Appendix B.
239
42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a)(15)(D) (West 2007).
240
See, e.g., In re Brianna D., 798 A.2d 413, 415 (R.I. 2002); In re Chapman,
631 P .2d 831 (Or. Ct. App. 1981 ).
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is not a guarantee that mentally disabled parents will receive these
mandated services. In B.S. v. Cullman, 241 two psychologists opined that
rehabilitative services might not enable the mother to successfully parent
on her own. Therefore, the court determined that providing services
"would place an undue burden on an agency, [which was] already
struggling with its duty to rehabilitate those parents and reunite those
families who [could] be aided by its assistance." 242 In N.R. v. State
Department of Human Resources, 243 the court similarly held that the
statute requiring services did not apply where a parent's conduct was
unlikely to change in the future; a Texas court found likewise in Salas v.
Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services. 244 These cases
demonstrate that, even in states with statutory obligations to provide
services, mentally disabled parents face barriers based on what may be
ambiguous or discriminatory criteria. 245
B. MENTAL DISABILITY AS A GROUND FOR TERMINATION

The ADA prohibits decisions based on a person's disabled status.
Supreme Court jurisprudence extends this prohibition to decisions
regarding parents. As discussed, the Court has long held that parenting
is a fundamental right2 46 and that states have the discretion to construct
and implement termination of parental rights statutes, limited by the
Stanley v. lllinois2 41 requirement that a state make an "individual
inquiry" into the fitness of the parent, not based on status, and the
Santosky v. Kramer2 48 requirement that termination be proved by "clear
and convincing evidence." As Stanley makes clear, the protection of the
family unit is inveterate. 249 Indeed, a prevalent quotation among courts
241

865 So. 2d 1188 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003).
Id. at 1196.
243
606 So. 2d 161 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992).
244
71 S.W.3d 783 (Tex. App. 2002).
245
SeeN.Y. Soc. SERV. § 384-b(4)(c), (6) (McKinney 2007).
246
Stanley, 405 U.S. 645; Santosky, 455 U.S. 745.
247
405 U.S. at 657.
248
455 U.S. at 756.
249
Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 ("[We have] ... frequently emphasized the
importance of the family. The rights to conceive and to raise one's children
have been deemed 'essential,' Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, (1923),
'basic civil rights of man,' Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541, 62 (1942),
and '[r]ights far more precious than property rights,' May v. Anderson, 345 U.S.
528, 533, (1953). 'It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
242
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and scholars250 is that termination of parental rights is "the family law
equivalent of the death penalty in a criminal case."251 States, however,
vary in their compliance with the ADA and Supreme Court
jurisprudence on the use of disabled status as a basis for termination. 252
Appendix C contains a chart of state laws regarding mental disability as
a ground for a TPR.
1. States in which Mental Disability Is an Express Statutory Ground for
Termination ofParental Rights
Under New York law, parental rights may be terminated when the
parent is "presently and for the foreseeable future unable, by reason of
mental illness or mental retardation, to provide proper and adequate care
for a child who has been in the care of an authorized agency for the
period of one year." 253 Mental illness is defined as "an affliction with a
mental disease or mental condition which is manifested by a disorder or
disturbance in behavior, feeling, thinking or judgment to such an extent
that if such child were placed in or returned to the custody of the parent,
254
the child would be in danger of becoming a neglected child. "
Mental
retardation is defined as "subaverage intellectual functioning which
originates during the developmental period and is associated with
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.' Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 64 S.Ct. 438, 442, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944). The
integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, Meyer v. Nebraska, supra, 262 U.S. at 399, the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Skinner v. Oklahoma,
supra, 316 U.S. at 541, and the Ninth Amendment, Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 496, (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring)").
250
See, e.g., In re FM, 163 P.3d 844, 851 (Wyo. 2007); In re K.D.L., 58 P.3d
181, 186 (Nev. 2002); In re Hayes, 679 N.E.2d 680, 683 (Ohio 1979); Douglas
E. Cressler, Requiring Proof Beyond A Reasonable Doubt in Parental Rights
Termination Cases, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 785, 794 (1994); Melissa L.
Breger, Introducing the Construct of the Jury into Family Violence Proceedings
and Family Court Jurisprudence, 13 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 12 (2006);
Bernardine Dohrn, Bad Mothers, Good Mothers, and the State: Children on the
Margins, 2 U. CHI L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1, 2 (1995); Leigh Goodmark,
Achieving Batterer Accountability in the Child Protection System, 63 KY. L. J.
613, 626 (2004).
251
In re Smith, 601N.E.2d45, 54 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
252
See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 384-b (McKinney 2007); see also Appendix C.
253
Id. § 384-b (4)(c) (McKinney 2007).
254
Id. § 384-b (6)(a) (McKinney 2007).
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impairment in adaptive behavior to such an extent that if such child were
placed in or returned to the custody of the parent, the child would be in
danger of becoming a neglected child as defined by the family court
act."255
The termination must be proven by "clear and convincing evidence,"
including an examination by a court-appointed psychiatrist or
psychologist. 256 Under the statute and case law, this person may base his
testimony on a single interview and is not required to review any
records 257or to perform any psychological tests on the parent. 258 If the
parent does not make herself available for the interview, the courtappointed psychiatrist or psychologist may testify on the basis of "other
available information."259 Although a parent is allowed to call her own
expert to testify, this is often impossible for indigent parents and their
court-appointed lawyers. 260 New York's indigent defense system has, in
255 Id.
256 Id. §§ 384-b (3)(g), 384-b (6)(c) (McKinney 2007).
257 See In re Loretta C., 32 A.D.3d 764, 765 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (interview
lasting only 40 minutes).

258In re Peter GG., 33 A.D.3d 1104 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).
259 N.Y. Soc. SERV LAW§ 384 b (6)(e) (McKinney 2007).
26°Court-appointed lawyers in New York are paid $75 per hour in and out-ofcourt, and the state will reimburse them up $125 per hour for a psychiatrist to
testify, and $90 per hour for a psychologist to testify. STATE OF NEW YORK,
APPELLATE DIVISION, SUPREME COURT, THIRD JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, LAW
GUARDIAN PROGRAM ADMINISTRATIVE HANDBOOK (2007) (prior to 2004, the
rate-of-pay for court-appointed lawyers was $40 in-court and $25 out-of-court).
According to a report commissioned by Chief Judge Kaye, these rates for courtappointed lawyers and their experts are inadequate, and coupled with extremely
high case loads, can result in sub-par defense. STATUS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN
NEW YORK: A STUDY FOR CHIEF JUDGE KAYE'S COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE
OF INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES (JUNE 16, 2006), available at
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/indigentdefense-commission/
SpangenbergGroupReport.pdf. Court-appointed attorneys also have difficulty
retaining experts: "There are situations where lawyers have to go begging for
experts ... to take cases on 18-b rates." Id. For a discussion of the crisis in the
representation of parents in child protective proceedings around the country,
including a lack of skill and resources, see Kathleen A Baillie, The Other

Neglected Parties in Child Protective Proceedings: Parents in Poverty and the
Lawyers Who Represent Them, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2285 (1998); Susan
Calkins, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Parental-Rights Termination
Cases: The Challenge for Appellate Courts, 6 J. APP PRAC & PROCESS 179
(2004). See also Mark Green et al., PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW

156

Virginia Journal ofSocial Policy & the Law

[Vol. 15:1

261

fact, been characterized as a "crisis" by numerous authorities.
Nevertheless, mental illness terminations have been held constitutional
by the New York Court of Appeals. 262
Although New Yark' s termination of parental rights statute never
has been reviewed in federal court; nor has the Court of Appeals
addressed it since the ADA's enactment, the statute likely would not
survive judicial scrutiny. The statute's "clear and convincing" standard
arguably is in violation of both the ADA and Supreme Court
jurisprudence. Important factual determinations often are based on the
opinions of a single psychiatrist who conducts only one interview,
assuming the parent consents to be interviewed by a psychiatrist at all;
because he has very limited interaction with the mentally disabled
parent, the psychiatrist inevitably makes statements based on
presumptions about group characteristics rather than on his own actual
observations of individual behavior. 263 Making assumptions based on
disability is precisely what Congress intended to eliminate with the
YORK, JUSTICE DENIED: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR BIRTH
p ARENTS IN CHILD WELFARE PROCEEDINGS, 30-31 (2000) (citing a study that
found that only 5% of Family Court cases in the Bronx contained at least one
motion by a parent's attorney).
261
"New York's indigent defense system is in a serious state of crisis .... Every
day - and for years - this dysfunctional system subjects indigent adults ...
across the state to a severe and unacceptable risk of being denied meaningful
and effective representation in violation of their state and federal right to
counsel. This crisis cannot be adequately addressed without a substantial
increase in statewide indigent defense funding." THE SPANGENBERG GROUP,
STATUS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN NEW YORK: A STUDY FOR CHIEF JUDGE
KAYE'S COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES ii
(2006), available at
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/indigentdefensecommission/SpangenbergGrou
pReport.pdf; see also Vitullo-Marten, supra note 109; NEW YORK APPELLATE
DIVISION FIRST DEPARTMENT COMMITTEE ON REPRESENTATION OF THE POOR,
CRISIS IN THE LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE POOR (2001); Sengupta, supra
note 106.
262
In re Nereida S., 439 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1982).
263
It also should be noted that diagnosis of mental illness is not always accurate.
Studies show that an individual who is hostile to the examiner is more likely to
be diagnosed with a serious mental illness, and many therapists "view the lack
of cooperation as evidence of mental illness." Paul Bernstein, Termination of
Parental Rights on the Basis of Mental Disability: A Problem in Policy and
Interpretation, 22 PAC. L.J. 1155, 1175 (1991). See also Kerr, supra note 230,
at 413 (arguing for input from a variety of sources, not just one psychiatrist).
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ADA, as shown by its finding that "individuals with disabilities are a
discrete and insular minority who have been ... subjected to a history of
purposeful unequal treatment ... based on ... stereotypic assumptions
not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to
participate in, and contribute to society."264 In light of the ADA's
purpose, one "expert" arguably does not satisfy the burden of proof
required under Stanley, 265 for an individual inquiry, and under Santosky,
266
for clear and convincing evidence, in a termination proceeding.
It is true that the Supreme Court has shown great deference to
"professional" opinions in the involuntary commitment context. In
Youngberg v. Romeo, the Court held that "decisions made by the
appropriate professional [in an institution] are entitled to a presumption
of correctness" because this "is necessary to enable institutions of this
type ... to continue to function." 267 However, the circumstances of a
TPR are different in that the state's interest in protecting institutions is
not involved. The state does have a compelling interest in protecting the
safety and "best interest" of the child, 268 but when considering testimony
at a TPR, safety is not at issue because a child is never immediately
returned to the parent if the TPR is denied. Indeed, it likely will be a
year or more before the parent regains physical custody. 269 Therefore,
264

42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2007).
Stanley, 405 U.S. 645.
266
Santosky, 455 U.S. 745.
267
457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982).
268
Supra note 69; see also N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(l)(a) (McKinney
2007) ("[T]he health and safety of children is of paramount importance"); see
also Appendix D.
269
When a TPR is denied, the agency is usually ordered to better plan with and
service the parent. See, e.g., Jn re Shantelle W., 185 A.D.2d 935, 940 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1992) ("Under the circumstances of this case, the petitioner's efforts
fell short of the reasonable efforts necessary to alleviate the mother's mental
illness and fulfill its obligation to strengthen the parental tie between mother
and child. Accordingly, we reverse the Family Court's finding, and direct the
petitioner to take additional steps to assist the mother in overcoming her
problems"); see also Jn re Jean G., 225 A.D.2d 779 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)
(overturning TPR because summons was deficient in that it did not give notice
that adoption of the child, without the parent's consent, could result); Jn re
Dochingozi B., 57 N.Y.2d 641 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (finding that statutory
requirements for a TPR had not been met, and remitting the matter to Family
Court for further proceedings). The child remains in foster care until the parent
has complied with the revised service plan, the visits have increased, and a trial
discharge has occurred. Under N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1089 (d)(2)(viii)(C)
265
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requiring a more in-depth mental health evaluation of the parent would
not infringe on the state's interests.
New York's statute is also problematic in that TPRs are based on
predictions about future behavior. 270 In civil confinement cases, courts
make decisions based on predictions of "dangerousness,"271 but experts
acknowledge the inaccuracy of these judgments; a quintessential review
of the scientific research concluded that two out of three clinical
predictions of future dangerousness were wrong, 272 and the American
Psychiatric Association states that unreliability of these predictions is
"an established fact within the profession."273 It is also clinically
difficult to predict the future behavior of mentally disabled parents, and
thus the impact of that behavior on the safety and well-being of the
child. 274 And, as discussed above, the decision in a TPR does not
(McKinney 2007), neither trial nor final discharge can take place without the
court finding that this is appropriate and issuing an order allowing for it. It is
usually at least one year following the denial of a TPR before the child is
reunited with the parent on either trial or permanent status.
270
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 384-b(4)(c) (McKinney 2007).
271
See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979); O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563, 573-4 (1975); Scopes v. Shah, 398 N.Y.S.2d 911, 913 (App. Div.
1977); see also LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 210.
272
JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 6-7
(National Institute of Mental Health 1981 ).
273
Brief Amicus Curiae for the American Psychiatric Association at 12,
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
274
See Robert Hayman, Jr., Presumptions of Justice: Law, Politics, and the
Mentally Retarded Parent, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1219 (1990) ("Scientific
evidence, however, does not suggest a meaningful correlation between mental
retardation and inadequate parenting. Moreover, the evidence does suggest that
any deficiencies in parenting are not immutable, but can be remedied with
proper training"); Michael Craft, Low Intelligence and Delinquency, in MENTAL
HANDICAP 53 (Michael Craft, Joan Bicknell & Sheila Hollins eds., 1985)
(stating that research indicates no correlation between mental retardation and
violence generally); Robert F. Schilling et. al., Child Maltreatment and
Mentally Retarded Parents: Is There a Relationship?, 20 MENTAL
RETARDATION 201, 206 (1982) (noting that evidence is contradictory on
whether mental retardation is correlated with child maltreatment); Teresa
Jacobsen et al., Assessing Parenting Competency in Individuals with Mental
Illness, 24 J. MENTAL HEALTH ADMIN. 189 (1997) (suggesting that determining
the parenting capabilities of individuals with severe mental disorders who are
alleged perpetrators of child abuse or neglect is a profoundly difficult task and
discussing the methodological shortcomings of some widely used assessment
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involve a calculation of imminent risk, yet the holding of the New York
Appellate Division was to resolve conflicting evidence of potential
parental abilities in favor of the petitioning agency. As the court
explained, "[W]e have consistently held that the possibility that
respondent's condition, with proper treatment, may improve in the future
is insufficient to over turn Family Court's determination . . .
Accordingly, to the extent that the expert opinions conflict with respect
to respondent's future ability to care for her children, we agree with
Family Court's resolution [terminating rights]." 275

strategies); Ronald Siefer et al., Parental Psychopathology, Multiple Contextual
Risks, and One-Year Outcomes in Children, 25 1. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL.
423 (1996) (pointing to the importance of examining different aspects of
maternal mental illness in social context and noting that maternal illness is not
universally associated with adverse child outcomes); Karen S. Budd & Michelle
J. Holdsworth, Issues in Clinical Assessment of Minimal Parenting Competence,
25 J. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 2 (1996) (stating that many of the tools
currently used for parenting assessments, such as projective tests, personality
profiles, and intelligence tests, were not intended for the purpose of evaluating
parenting capability or for parents with major psychiatric illness, and they are
not empirically linked with observed parenting behavior); HARRIET P. LEFLEY,
FAMILY CAREGIVING IN MENTAL ILLNESS 72 (David E. Biegel & Richard
Schulz eds. 1996) ("[An] analysis of recent studies ... of violent behavior by
individuals with serious mental illness ... conclude[s] that the vast majority of
mentally ill persons are not more dangerous than others in the general
population"); Morton M. Silverman, Children of Psychiatrical/y Ill Parents: A
Prevention Perspective, 40 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY1257, 1259
(1989) (A 1983 study found that "[a]s the depressed mothers recovered, many,
but not all, of the reported problems in the mothers' relationships with other
children improved, and many of the adolescent's problems diminished as
well"); Mrinal Mullick, et al., Insight into Mental Illness and Child
Maltreatment Risk Among Mothers with Major Psychiatric Disorders, 52
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 488 (2001) (concluding that insight into mental illness
may function as a protective factor that influences the risk of child maltreatment
in mothers with mental illness and that measures of insight could be usefully
incorporated into comprehensive parenting assessments for mothers with
psychiatric disorders).
275
In re Trebor, 295 A.D.2d 648 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
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Thirty-one other states 276 also link mental disability to a present and
future inability to care for a child, leaving the terms open to
interpretation and ripe for potentially discriminatory judgments. 277 As
described in Part I, there are an array of services for parents with
disabilities, 278 and many can care for children with appropriate
support, 279 but when the statutory definitions are vague, it becomes easy

276

See Appendix C. One other state, Wisconsin, terminates mentally disabled
parents' rights on the basis of disability but only "when the parent is presently,
and for a cumulative period of at least 2 years within the 5 years immediately
prior to the filing of the petition has been, an inpatient at one or more hospitals .
. . licensed treatment facilities ... or state treatment facilities" on account of
mental illness or developmental disability. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.415(3)(a)
(West 2007).
277
See Alexis C. Collentine, Respecting Intellectually Disabled Parents: A Call
for Change in State Termination of Parental Rights Statutes. 34 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 535 (2005); see also Kerr, supra note 230.
278
See supra notes 96 and 100 for a description of the services in New York and
supra note 145 for a description of the national housing programs. See also
Invisible Children's Project, http://www.nmha.org/go/icp__project (last visited
Oct. 31, 2007); Mental Health America, Frequently Asked Questions: How do I
find a local Mental Health America affiliate?, http://www.nmha.org/go/
find_affiliate (last visited Oct. 31, 2007); Mental Health Association in New
Jersey Programs and Services, http://www.mhanj.org/ProgramsServices/
prog_serv2.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2007); Beth R. Hinden et al., A Survey of
Programs for Parents with Mental Illness and Their Families: Identifying
Common Elements to Build the Evidence Base, 33 J. BEHAV. HEALTH SERVICES
& RES. 21 (2006).
279
See David McConnell & Gwynnyth Llewellyn, Stereotypes, Parents with
Intellectual Disability and Child Protection, 24 J. Soc. WELFARE & FAM. L. 297
(2002); Hayman, supra note 274; Daphna Oyserman et al., Resources and
Supports for Mothers with Severe Mental Illness, 19 HEAL TH & SOCIAL WoRK
132, 141 (1994) ("[T]here is no reason to assume that women with [severe
mental illness] cannot function as mothers"); J. Bazar, Mentally Ill Moms Aided
in Keeping Their Children, THE APA MONITOR 32 (Dec. 1990) (concluding that
a large percentage of mothers with severe mental illness can be successful as
mothers with adequate support programs); Teresa Jacobsen, Mentally Ill
Mothers in the Parenting Role: Clinical Management and Treatment, in
PARENTAL PSYCHIATRIC DISORDER: DISTRESSED PARENTS AND THEIR FAMILIES
114 (Michael Gopfert et al. eds., Cambridge University Press, 2d ed. 2003)
(noting that services that build on a mentally ill parent's strengths and engage
the parent in a collaborative process are more successful); Joanne Nicholson &
Andrea Blanch, Rehabilitation for Parenting Roles for People with Serious
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to make an automatic leap from disability to inability to care for a child,
in both casework practice and as proof in court.
Another problematic, but unique, aspect of New York's statute is
that once parental rights are terminated based on mental disability, the
case is closed; there is no statutory requirement that the court decide
whether the TPR also is in the best interest of the child. 280 In New York,
TPRs based on permanent neglect281 and TPRs based on severe or
repeated abuse 282 are bifurcated proceedings: first, the grounds for the
TPR are proven at trial, and then a dispositional hearing is held to decide
whether it is in the child's best interest to be committed to the custody
and guardianship of the agency. 283 This dispositional hearing is the only
time the court considers best interest, and custody is not transferred until
the conclusion of the hearing. 284 In every other state, the TPR
proceeding is not bifurcated; the court contemplates the grounds for a
TPR simultaneously with the best interest of the child, and custody is
committed at the conclusion of a single trial. 285 The Supreme Court of
Rhode Island encapsulates the reasoning behind this: "Once [parental
unfitness] is established, the best interests of the child outweigh all other
286
consideration~. "
Many states also elaborate on the best-interest criteria to be used in a
TPR, and ASF A waives its mandate for filing a TPR if it is against the
best interest of a child. 287 Numerous states require consideration of the
Mental Illness, 18 PSYCHOSOCIAL REHABILITATION J. 109 (1994) (outlining a
model of effective rehabilitation for parents).
280
See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 384-b(4)(c), (6) (McKinney 2007).
281
Id. § 384-b(4)(d).
282
Id. § 384-b(4)(e).
283
Id. § 384-b(3)(g). Dispositional hearings are conducted in cases of
permanent neglect as provided in N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT§§ 623, 631 (McKinney
2007), and in cases of severe or repeated abuse, as provided in N.Y. Soc. SERV.
LAW§ 384-b(8)(f).
284
See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 384-b (McKinney 2007); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§ 631 (McKinney 2007); In re Troy M., 156 Misc.2d 1000, 1003-05 (N.Y. Fam.
Ct. 1992).
285
See Appendix D.
286
In re Kristen B., 558 A.2d 200, 203 (R.I. 1989).
287
ASF A provides the following as compelling reasons not to file a TPR: the
child is being cared for by a relative; the state agency has documented in the
case plan that a TPR is not in the best interest of the child; or reasonable efforts
by the agency to reunify the family have not been made. 42 U.S.C.
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child's wishes either in the TPR itself 88 or as a compelling reason why
the agency does not have to file a TPR petition. 289 New York considers
the child's wishes as a compelling reason, 290 but under the law, the
agency may still choose to file a TPR petition. 291 If the agency does
choose to file a petition, the potential for adoption will not factor into the
court's rulings during the TPR fact-finding, 292 which is the only hearing
a mentally disabled parent receives.
Many states also consider the character of the parent-child
relationship, 293 including the record of visitation and communication294
§ 675(5)(E)(i)-(iii) (2007). Many state laws expand on the types of situations
that fit the "not in the best interest" category. See infra notes 289, 293-94, 298
& 341.
288
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(c)(l)(B) (2007) (for children 12 years
and older); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-l 12(j)(k) (2007) (all children); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-2353(b)(4) (2007); IOWA CODE ANN.§ 232.l 16(3)(b) (2006)
(for children 10 and older); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4055 (2007) (for
children 12 and older); MD CODE ANN., FAM. LAW,§ 5-323(d)(4)(i), (iii) (2007)
(for children of any age); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.l-283(G) (2007) (for children 14
and older). N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(3)(k) (McKinney 2007) states that,
"where the child is over fourteen years of age, the court may, in its discretion,
consider the wishes of the child in determining whether the best interests of the
child are promoted by the commitment of guardianship and custody of the
child"; however, the court does not actually consider best interest until the
dispositional hearing, which does not occur in mental disability cases.
289
See Cow. REV. STAT.§ 19-3-702(5)(a)(II) (West 2007); N.M. STAT. ANN.§
32A-4-29(G)(3) (West 2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-20.1(7)(b)(5) (2007);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6-5b(b )(2) (West 2007).
290
See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(3)(l)(ii)(C) (McKinney 2007)
(considering whether the child is fourteen years of age or older and will not
consent to his or her adoption).
291
See id. § 384-b(3)(l)(i)(B).
292
See infra note 310.
293
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-112(j)(3)(D) (West 2007); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 232.111(2)(b)(2) (West 2007); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5323(d)(4)(i) (West 2007); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.447(7)1 (West 2007); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 128.108(1) (West 2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-429(G)(2) (West 2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414(D)(l)-(2) (West
2007); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 36-l-l 13(i)(4) (West 2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33
§ 5540(4) (2007). A positive parent-child relationship also is a compelling
reason not to file a TPR in New Mexico. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-29(G)(2)
(West 2007).
294
See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(c)(l)(A) (West 2007); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 17a-l 12(k)(6)(A) (West 2007); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.447(6)
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(even when this is not part of proving the TPR) 295 and the maintenance
of regular contact with the guardian or other custodian of the child; 296 the
potential effects on the child of severing the relationship; 297 the potential
of the child to be adopted; 298 what effect a TPR would have on a sibling
relationship, 299 including whether it would substantially interfere with
it; 300 the general potential for the TPR to do more harm than good; 301 and
the child's adjustment to community, home, placement, and school. 302
Some states also allow courts to find that a TPR is not in a child's best
interest if the parent proves by a preponderance of evidence that the
child will not be harmed in the future, 303 or that she had good cause for
failing to comply with the service plan; 304 or because of other
circumstances, such as a parent being committed to an institution,
(West 2007). A record of visitation also is a compelling reason not to file a
TPRin Colorado. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-702(3.5)(a), (5)(a)(I) (West
2007). General compliance and progress with the service plan is a compelling
reason not to file a TPR in New Mexico and Oregon. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A4-29(G)(l) (West 2007); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 419B.498(2)(b)(A) (West
2005).
295
Cf N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(7)(b) (McKinney 2007) (providing that
visitation and communication issues are only considered in a TPR based on
permanent neglect, as part of the fact-finding).
296
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ l 7a-l 12(k)(6)(B) (West 2007).
297
Mo. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-323 (2007).
298
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-34l(b)(3)(A)(i) (2007); CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 366.26 (2007). In addition, under several state statutes, if
adoption is not the permanency plan, but the child is otherwise in an appropriate
placement, this can be a compelling reason for the agency to be permitted not to
file a TPR petition. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-3-702(5)(a)(III) (2007).
Another compelling reason under numerous state statutes not to file a TPR
petition, when otherwise required, is if the child is being cared for by a relative.
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.§ 17a-llla (2007); Mo. REV. STAT.§ 211.447
(2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.498 (2005). Under N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §
384-b(3)(l)(ii)(B) (McKinney 2007), New York allows an agency not to file a
petition if the permanency goal is other than adoption. But see supra note 291;
infra note 310.
299
Mo. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-323 (2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 215 l.4 l 4(D)(l) (2007).
3
oo CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 366.26(E) (2007).
301
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26 (2007); IOWA CODE § 232.111 (2006);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.19b (2007); MINN. STAT. § 260C.312 (2006); N.J.
STAT. ANN.§ 30:4C-15.l(a)(4) (2007).
302
Mo. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW§ 5-323 (2007).
303
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.090 (2007).
304
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 3-504 (2007).
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including a hospital, or if the parent's absence in the child's life is due to
service in the armed forces. 305 Utah also forbids the court to terminate
rights on the ground that the parent has failed to complete a treatment
plan. 306 Interestingly, Connecticut factors into best interest "the extent to
which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful
relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the
other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person,"307
which presumably includes a caseworker.
In contrast to these states' extensive best-interest inquiries, which
are mandated for all TPRs, courts in New York repeatedly have held that
a dispositional hearing is not necessary for terminations based on mental
illness or mental retardation. 308 Not only is this unequal treatment for
disabled parents, but it can, in fact, be contrary to the best interest of the
child. This is frequently the case when adoption is a long-shot or the
child is over the age of fourteen and does not want to be adopted. 309
Unlike in the states discussed above, the potential of a child to be
adopted is not part of the court's consideration during a TPR fact-finding
in New York; 310 adoptability would be considered at a dispositional
305

IOWA CODE§ 232.1163 (e) (2006).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-407(2) (2007).
307
CONN. GEN. STAT.§ l 7a-l 12(k)(7) (2007).
308
See In re Henry W., 818 N.Y.S.2d 348 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); In re Winston
Lloyd D., 7 A.D.3d 706 (N.Y. App. Div 2004); In re Nina D., 6 A.D.3d 702
(N.Y. App. Div. 2004); In re Guardianship of P.E.G., 2004 WL 2921862 (N.Y.
Fam. Ct. 2004); Jn re Harry K., 270 A.D.2d 928 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000); In re
Juliana V., 249 A.D.2d 314 (N. Y. App. Div. 1998).
309
In New York, a young person fourteen years or older must consent to his or
her adoption unless the court "dispenses with such consent." N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW § 1 ll(l)(a) (McKinney 2007). In the dispositional hearing following a
TPR based on permanent neglect or severe or repeated abuse, the judge will ask
the law guardian whether her client, if he or she is fourteen years or older, plans
to consent to adoption. However, the potential to be adopted is not considered
at the TPR fact-finding, infra note 310, which is the only hearing a mentally
disabled parent receives. So, a young person with a mentally disabled parent
can become a legal orphan, infra notes 311 and 313, solely because the grounds
for TPR are proven, even if there is little likelihood that he or she will be
adopted.
310
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 384-b(3)(i) (McKinney 2007) ("[P]roof oflikelihood
that the child will be placed for adoption shall not be required in determining
whether the best interest of the child would be promoted by the commitment of
the guardianship and custody of the child to an authorized agency"). This has
been upheld in In re Peter GG., 33 A.D.3d 1104, 1105 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006)

306
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hearing, but, again, mentally disabled parents are not entitled to these
hearings.
New York's lack of dispositional hearings following mental
disability TPRs has contributed to the multitude of young people still in
the state's foster care system (particularly adolescents) whose parents'
rights had been terminated years ago but who never were adopted. 311
This problem of "legal orphans" also has been exacerbated by the strict
timelines of ASFA, 312 and is endemic across the country. 313 In New
("[C]ourts have terminated parental rights even though 'readoptive homes
[have] not been found' . . . and 'there is no evidence that adoption is
contemplated"' (internal citations omitted)).
311
In 2005, there were 9,219 such children awaiting adoption in New York, and
this number excludes those who were sixteen and older with a goal of discharge
to another planned permanent living arrangement (not adoption). U.S.
Department of Health & Human Services, Administration for Children &
Families, Children in Public Foster Care Waiting to be Adopted (2007),
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats_research/afcars/waiting2005.pdf.
The mean length of time in New York between a TPR and adoption is 19.07
months. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Administration for
Children & Families, Time Between TPR and Finalization (2007),
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats_research/aN.Y.FAM.CT.ACTrs/
statistics/tpr_tbl4_2005.htm. New York ranks the lowest among all fifty states
in the number of children who are adopted within twenty-four months of
entering foster care.
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services,
Administration for Children & Families, child welfare outcomes 2003: Annual
report
(2003),
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cwo03/chapters/
chapterthree2003 .htm.
312
Supra note 112. Almost all states, including New York, N.Y. Soc. SERV.
LA w § 3 84-b(3 )(l)(i) (McKinney 2007), have adopted the fifteen out of twentytwo month requirement into their statutes, either requiring an agency to file a
petition when a child has been in care under this time frame, or as a ground for
TPR, or both. See, e.g., ALA. CODE§ 26-18-5 (1975); COLO. REV. STAT.§ 193-604; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, §§ 26, 29C; ch. 210, § 3 (2003). Some states
have a fewer than fifteen-month requirement for a child to be in care before a
TPR petition must be filed. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-341 (2007); R.I.
GEN. LAWS§ 15-7-7 (1956).
313
Since ASFA became law, there have been approximately 117,000 more
terminations than actual adoptions. Adoptions Stall, More Legal Orphans
Created by Failed Law, National Child Advocacy Group Says, ASCRIBE
NEWSWIRE, http://www.ascribe.org/cgi-bin/behold.pl?ascribeid=2004 l 228.09 l
006&time=09%2030%20PST&year=2004&public= I. In January 2005, there
were 117,395 legal orphans nationwide. Id. Because of this problem, a study of
legal orphans was commissioned by the federal Administration for Children &
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York, these young people essentially have no legal recourse 314 and often
315
wonder why they are in limbo.
Sometimes their parents' behavior
Families. us DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, ADMINISTRATION
FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, ABUSE, NEGLECT, ADOPTION & FOSTER CARE
RESEARCH, TERMINATING THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF OLDER CHILDREN, 20032004,
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/opre/abuse_neglect/term_rights/term_rights_o
verview.html#overview. See also Esther Wattenberg & Meghan Kelley, A
Memo on Legal Orphans: Are We Creating a New Class of Children in Limbo?
(April 30, 1999), http://ssw.che.umn.edu/img/assets/4467I Legal_Orphans_
Memo.pdf; Barbara White Stack, Law to Increase Adoptions Results in More
Orphans, PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE, Jan. 2, 2005, available at
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/national/206256_ orphans03.html.
Some states
have changed their laws because of the problem of legal orphans. Washington
(House Bill 1624 added a new section to WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.215 in
2007) and California (AB 519, enacted in 2005 to amend CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE§§ 213.5, 366.26 (2007)) now allow children to petition to reinstate their
parents' rights. Some states also have strict statutory mandates for reviewing
the status of a child's adoption post-TPR, and for reconsidering the TPR ifthere
is a lack of progress. Rhode Island requires that "in the event any child, the
parental rights to whom have been finally terminated, has not been placed by
the agency in the home of a person or persons with the intention of adopting the
child within thirty (30) days from the date of the final termination decree, the
family court shall review the status of the child." R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(g)
(1956). In D.C., the court must review the adoption every six months and can
order change of agency for lack of progress. D.C. CODE § 16-2360(b), (e)
(2001).
314
Agencies are prohibited from having any contact with parents whose rights
have been terminated. See statutes cited supra note 74. It is technically
possible to vacate a termination of parental rights judgment under N. Y. C.P .L.R.
5015 (2007), but this rarely happens. See Diane Riggs, Permanence Can Mean
Going Home, ADOPTALK (Spring 2006), available at http://www.nacac.org/
adoptalk/permanence.html (noting that judges in New York "are not inclined to
reverse something as serious as a TPR without irrefutable evidence that a
child's best interests are served by the reversal"). However, this can be done
more easily in Washington and California under new laws specific to vacating
TPRs. See sources cited supra note 313.
315
I have represented and spoken with hundreds of young people who are
confused and distraught over this situation. They do not understand why their
parents' rights were terminated in the past if they never wanted this and there
was never a substantial likelihood that they would be adopted. At the time of
the termination, many desired to see their parents, and they continued to do so
in the years they remained in foster care. This includes young people with
mentally disabled parents. One 20 year-old client of mine, who had been in
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improves, or the parent-child relationship flourishes outside the watchful
eye of the system, and the parents become viable resources again,
especially as the child grows older and issues such as excessive corporal
punishment become irrelevant. 316 Aside from the emotional turmoil of
longing to be reunified with the parent, this enduring or rekindled bond
can have the unintended consequence of motivating a young person to
leave the system before he or she is ready3 17 in order to be with the
parent, because the parent cannot be a discharge resource once her rights
have been terminated. 318 There is arguably no reason, then, to terminate
the parental rights of a child who lacks a concrete adoption plan, even if
foster care since she was two years old, and now had four children of her own,
maintained a relationship with her mentally disabled mother outside the system.
Her mother provided much needed help with child care as well as financial and
emotional support.
316
For example, one of my former clients, whose mother's rights were
terminated eight years earlier (prior to my representation) because of mental
illness and drug addiction, was living in a residential treatment facility after two
pre-adoptive placements had failed. The plan was for him to remain at the
facility at least until he completed his high school degree and had a way of
supporting himself. However, as he approached his eighteenth birthday, he
began communicating with his mother again, and was insistent on discharging
himself after his eighteenth birthday so he could have more contact with her (a
young person in New York State can remain in foster care after his or her
eighteenth birthday, until age 21, but must consent to do so. See N.Y. FAM. Cr.
§ 1087(a) (McKinney 2007); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, §§
430.12(f)(3)(c), 441.2(a)(ii)(c), 628.3(a)(l)(vii) (McKinney 2007)). In fact, my
client's mother did not have a place for him to live, but my client was so
frustrated with the agency's inability and refusal to plan with her, that he
insisted on discharging himself. I encouraged him to remain in foster care until
he had a place to live, a high school diploma, and an income. He was still in
foster care at the time I transferred the case, but I do not know what has
happened since.
317
See statutes cited supra note 316. This contributes further to the problem of
youth who are discharged from foster care without housing, education, or
employment, which is endemic around the country. See MARTHA SHIRK &
GARY STRANGLER, ON THEIR OWN: WHAT HAPPENS TO KIDS WHEN THEY AGE
OUT OF FOSTER CARE (Westview Press 2004); Children Who Age Out of the
Foster Care System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Income Security and
Fami~v Support of the Comm. on Ways and Means, I 10th Cong. (2007)
(testimony of Mark E. Courtney, Chapin Hall Faculty Associate); ROBERT M.
GEORGE, ET AL., EMEPLOYMENT OUTCOMES FOR YOUTH AGING OUT OF FOSTER
CARE (Chapin Hall Publications 2002); THE YOUTH ADVOCACY CENTER, THE
FUTURE OF TEENS IN FOSTER CARE (2001 ).
318
See sources cited supra note 74.
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reunification seems far-fetched at the time the agency contemplates
filing a TPR. As practitioners know, the long life of a child welfare case
is unpredictable and it is often best to keep all options open. 319
New York's law also is problematic in that it does not allow for a
suspended judgment of a TPR320 based on mental disability, 321 as it does
for TPRs based on permanent neglect322 or severe or repeated abuse. 323
Therefore, whatever the "expert" testifies to regarding a mentally
disabled parent's abilities in the foreseeable future will have permanent
effects; unlike non-disabled parents, 324 disabled parents are never
319

Two other clients of mine, adolescent sisters, wavered for two years over
whether they wanted to be reunited with their mother or be adopted by their
foster mother. However, one day I received a phone call that the sisters had
been removed from their foster home on an emergency basis because of
allegations of a sexual relationship between the foster mother's son and one of
the sisters. These allegations were later shown to be unfounded; however,
neither of the clients ever spoke to the foster mother, the person who was
supposed to adopt them, again. At the present time, the clients are living in
another foster home, but fervently wish to return to their mother. Stories like
this one are extremely common in the foster care system. See, e.g., In re
Rasheed A., G 19009/06, N.Y.L.J (8/3/07) (holding that, despite state and
federal precedent that a parent whose rights have been terminated cannot
subsequently seek guardianship or custody of the same child, it was proper in
this case to award guardianship to terminated mother because of the extremely
complicated and difficult experience and behavior of the child in his adoptive
home, his profound attachment to his mother, and it was the only available
avenue for permanency endorsed by the forensic psychologist for this child,
aside from institutionalization).
320
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 384-b(8)(t), (12) (McKinney 2007), and N.Y. FAM.
CT. Act 633 (McKinney 2007) allow for the court, at the conclusion of the TPR,
to grant a period of up to one year (with the possibility of a subsequent one-year
extension) during which the judgment on the TPR is suspended, as long as the
parent complies with court-ordered conditions. At the end of the period, if the
parent has complied, the TPR will be dismissed.
321
See In re Ernesto Thomas A., 5 A.D.3d 380, 381 (N.Y. 2004); In re SarahBeth H., 34 A.D.3d 242 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); In re Dionne W., 267 A.D.2d
1096 (N.Y. App. Div 1999).
322
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 384-b(l2) (McKinney 2007).
323
Id. § 384-b(8)(t).
324
Suspended judgments are a significant possibility for respondents in
permanent neglect and severe/repeated abuse cases. In 2005, 8.3% of TPRs in
New York ended in suspended judgments. NEW YORK STATE Kms' WELLBEING INDICATORS, KWIC INDICATOR PROFILE: FOSTER CARE TPR
JUDGMENTS: SUSPENDED JUDGMENTS,

Fall 2007]

No Chance to Prove Themselves

169

granted an additional year to make improvements if the grounds for the
TPR are weak or if it does not appear to be in the child's best interest to
terminate rights at the time of the TPR fact-finding. 325 While no other
states have provisions for suspended judgments, some courts have
granted comparable time periods to allow both disabled and nondisabled parents to reform. 326 In contrast, New York's statute and case
law regarding suspension of judgments explicitly treats disabled parents
differently than non-disabled parents, and does not allow for
exceptions. 327
2. States in which Mental Disability Is Not an Express Statutory Ground
for Termination of Parental Rights

Seventeen states, as well as the District of Columbia, 328 do not
specify mental disability as a ground for termination, but leave it to the
court to determine a parent's abilities given all relevant factors.
Vermont and Minnesota are illustrative of such a viewpoint. 329 In
Vermont, the court may consider providing financial support, being in
regular communication, meeting the child's physical and emotional
needs, and providing a safe environment. 330 In Minnesota, the court can
terminate rights
because of a consistent pattern of specific conduct ... or
of specific conditions directly relating to the parent and
child relationship either of which are determined by the
court to be of a duration or nature that renders the parent
unable, for the reasonable foreseeable future, to care
appropriate for ... the child. 331
http://www.nyskwic.org/access_data/ind_profile.cfm?sublndicatorlD=85&go.x
=9&go.y=l0.
325
See cases cited supra note 321.
326
See, e.g., In re M.R .. 2002 WL 31655025 (Minn. App. 2002) (affirming trial
court's finding that, when all parties agreed at the scheduled TPR to postpone
the trial for four to six months to allow mentally disabled respondent more time
to complete her programs, this postponement was in the best interests of the
children).
327
Supra notes 320-22.
328
See Appendix C.
329
MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 260C.301(1)(b)(4) (2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A § 3504 (2006). See also MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 712A.19b (2007).
330
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A § 3-504 (2006).
331
MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 260C.30l(l)(b)(4) (2007).
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In these states, a mentally disabled parent's rights could be
terminated if one or more of the statutory factors are met, but never
simply because of the parent's disabled status.

C. NEW YORK STATE LAW AS A PRIME EXAMPLE OF AN ADA VIOLATION
New York's termination of parental rights statute is discriminatory
on its face because it mandates services for non-disabled parents but not
for disabled parents. New York's law also is discriminatory in that it
allows a court to terminate parental rights on the basis of status; without
services, parents with mental disabilities cannot demonstrate their
individual capabilities, and judges therefore make decisions based on the
mental illness instead of on the parent's individual capabilities.
The counter-argument is that a parent's rights are terminated because
there is "clear and convincing evidence" that the disability renders her
unable to care for her child, and not because of her illness per se. 332 But,
as contended, the standard by which this is proven - based on the
testimony of one expert who may interview the parent just once, and
without review ofrecords - is not satisfactory.
Furthermore, the lack of a dispositional hearing (and the possibility
of a suspended judgment) following a mental illness termination is both
discriminatory and potentially against the best interest of the child.
III. A CALL FOR CHANGE IN STATUTES AND PRACTICE, BASED ON
RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHTS GRANTED UNDER THE ADA
Some states have incorporated the principles of the Americans with
Disabilities Act into their statutes and case law, but more can be
accomplished by state legislatures and judiciaries, as well as by arguably
the most influential arm of child welfare - the agencies and their
caseworkers. The caseworker is the one, after all, who is most involved
in the daily life of a family; lawyers and judges are often unaware of the
intricacies and difficulties of a case until a court appearance. 333
Numerous scholars and practitioners have noted that court proceedings
332

N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(4)(c) (McKinney 2007) was held
constitutional for this reason in In re Nereida S., 454 N.Y.S.2d 61 (N.Y. 1982).
333
See Jennifer Ayres Hand, Note, Preventing Undue Terminations: A Critical
Evaluation of the Length-of-Time-Out-of-Custody Ground for Termination of
Parental Rights, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1251, 1281 n.164 (1996).
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are often ineffective for addressing a family's needs and for holding the
agency to its mandate. 334
One state, Arkansas, has actually written the Americans with
Disabilities Act into its child welfare statute. 335 A court can only
terminate parental rights after it has found, by clear and convincing
evidence, that "despite a meaningful effort ... to rehabilitate the parent
and correct the conditions that caused removal, those conditions have not
been remedied by the parent,"336 provided, however, that "[t]he
department shall make reasonable accommodations in accordance with
the Americans with Disabilities Act .... to parents with disabilities in
order to allow them meaningful access to reunification and family
preservation services. " 337 Other state statutes, although making no
reference to the ADA, explicitly require that reunification services be
appropriate, 338 accessible, 339 and realistic 340 to the needs of parents. 341
In addition, Idaho's TPR statute provides that, if the parent "has a
disability, the parent shall have a right to provide evidence to the court
regarding the manner in which adaptive equipment or supportive
services will enable the parent to carry out parenting responsibilities." 342
This right is limited, however, by what follows: "Nothing in this section
334

Id. at 1281 ("Indeed, more than one commentator has suggested that some
judges "'rubber stamp" reasonable efforts' on cases without insisting that the
agency meet its burden").
335
ARK. CODE ANN.§ 9-27-34l(b)(l)(B)(vii)(b) (2007).
336
Id.§ 9-27-341(b)(l)(B)(i)(a).
337
Id. § (b)(l)(B)(vii)(b) (internal citations omitted).
338
325 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/8.2 (West 2007); N.H. REV. STAT. § 169-C:24-a
111.(c) (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 26-8A-21 (2007).
339
MINN. STAT.§ 260.012(h)(2), (4), (6) (2007); N.H. REV. STAT.§ 169-C:24-a
III(c).
340
MINN. STAT. § 260.012(h)(2), (4), (6).
341
Under numerous state statutes, another compelling reason to refrain from
filing a petition to terminate rights arises if the parent has not been afforded
reasonable opportunity to avail herself of services, or services had not been
provided to her. See, e.g., ALA. CODE 1975 § 26-18-5(b)(3) (2007); ALASKA
STAT. § 47.10.088(e)(2) (2007); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-604 (2007); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 17a-llla(b) (2007); D.C. CODE § 16-2354(g)(3) (2007); FLA.
STAT. § 39.8055(2)(b)(5) (2007); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 405/2-23 (2007), 750
ILL. COMP. STAT.§ 50/1 (2007); IND. CODE§ 31-35-2-4.5 (2007). This also is a
compelling reason for an agency not to file a petition under ASFA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 675(5) (2006).
342
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-2005(6) (2007).
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shall be construed to create any new or additional obligation on state or
local governments to purchase or provide adaptive equipment or
supportive services for parents with disabilities."343 This provision
seems to hint at the fundamental alteration defense available to states in
ADA claims, 344 but without the strict guidance of the federal law, which
requires a balancing test to determine when reasonable accommodations
must be made for the disabled. 345 Still, the Idaho statute at least
acknowledges the existence of disabled parents and the need to examine
reasonable accommodations at TPRs. Moreover, the case law in some
other states indicates an acknowledgment of the need to treat disabled
parents equitably-providing services where non-disabled parents
receive them, 346 and ensuring that such services are tailored so they have
a chance to prove themselves. 347
Id.
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2007).
345
Supra note 155.
346
In re Christopher B., 823 A.2d 301 (R.I. 2003); In re Welfare of S.Z., 547
N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1996); In re Welfare ofK.D.W., No. Co-91-155, 1991 WL
151349 (Minn. Ct. App. August 13, 1991); In re Chapman, 631 P.2d 831 (Or.
Ct. App. 1981).
347
In re Christopher B., 823 A.2d at 313 ("[W]e hold that [the agency], in
petitioning for a TPR decree on mental-deficiency grounds, was required to
demonstrate that it undertook reasonable efforts to address these mentaldeficiency issues in the services it offered to this parent ... reasonable efforts to
reunify a family must in some way include an offer of services that would be
reasonable under the particular circumstances of each given case-taking into
account the particular needs of the subject family-including the mental
deficiency of a parent"); In re Welfare of the Children of M.R., No. C4-02-446,
2002 WL 31655025 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2002) ("Generally, for services
to be 'reasonable,' the responsible agency must provide services that would
assist in alleviating the conditions that led to the out-of-home placement"); In re
Welfare of D.F., No. C0-97-461, 1997 WL 407799 (Minn. Ct. App. July 22,
1997) (stating that it is necessary to assess whether services go beyond mere
logistics, such as scheduling of appointments, to provide genuine assistance that
might conceivably improve the circumstances of the parent and the relationship
of the parent with the child.); In re C.P.B., 641 S.W.2d 456 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)
(stating reunification plan must make clear what criteria would be applied to
determine compliance). See also In re Dependency of H.W., 961 P.2d 963
(Wash. Ct. App. 1998); In re Custody and Parental Rights of M.M., 894 P.2d
298 (Mont. 1995); In re Victoria M., 255 Cal. Rptr. 498 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); In
re D.L.S., 432 N.W.2d 31 (Neb. 1988); In re Welfare of B.L.W., 395 N.W.2d
426 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); In re S.P.W., 707 S.W.2d 814 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986);
In re M.L.W., 452 A.2d 1021 (Pa. Super. Ct.1982); In re C.M.E., 448 A.2d 59
343
344
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Even some New York courts have reached the conclusion that
mentally disabled parents must be treated equitably, independent of state
or federal mandates. 348 Before ASFA and the ADA, the court in In re
Catholic Guardian Society of the Diocese of Brooklyn denied a mental
illness termination because of an agency's failure to engage in diligent
efforts with a mentally retarded parent. 349 "The failure of petitioner to
make diligent efforts .. .is critical, not because Social Services Law
Section 384-b(4)(c) contains a diligent efforts mandate, but because [this
failure makes it] difficult if not impossible to assess the foreseeable
future parental capacity of the respondent. It could be said that the
question of diligent efforts is but one issue that is subsumed within the
more general mandate in SSL Section 384-b(4)(c) to demonstrate ... what
the respondent's adaptation will be in the 'foreseeable future. "'350 The
Court of Appeals In re Joyce T.W. Burton Richardson,. also held that
"termination [for mental illness] requires a ... consideration of measures
on the part of the State to maintain the family setting." 351
But New York and other states can do more about what the courts
often acknowledge is an unfair and "painful"352 process for mentally
disabled parents. In In re Henry W, a New York court reluctantly
terminated the parental rights of a mildly retarded father who held a job
and acquired a home, not because of any "wrong doing or fault on [the
parent's] part" but because a psychologist, who performed two
evaluations of the father, concluded that he could not parent the child
independently. 353 Similarly, in In re Ashley L., the respondent mother
showed "substantial improvements in her ability to tolerate stress, take
her medications and cooperate in treatment." but the TPR was granted;
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); Kerr, supra note 230, at 415 (emphasizing the importance
of tailored services).
348
In In re Dependency of WW Children, the court actually rejected the
agency's position that it could determine that a mentally retarded parent was
unable to care for her children in the foreseeable future without providing
services, because even though "a reading of [N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW] § 384-b
(4)(c) clearly shows that ... the legislature does not mandate a showing of
diligent efforts by the agency, it does not in any way preclude such a showing."
736 N.Y.S.2d 567, 576 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2001). See also In re Viana Children,
476 N.Y.S.2d 750 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1984).
349
499 N.Y.S.2d 587 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1986).
350
Id. at 596.
351
65- N.Y.2d 39, 48 (N.Y. 1985).
352
In re Henry W., 818 N.Y.S.2d at 351.
353 Id.
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354

in In re Antonio, the respondent mother's rights were terminated,
despite the fact that she had completed her service plan and was seeing a
psychiatrist weekly, because of the court-appointed psychologist's
testimony, which was based on a single interview. 355
New York and other states could avoid these heart-wrenching
decisions by following the lead of some other states, which have found
innovative ways to avoid or mitigate the permanency of a TPR while still
providing the child of a mentally disabled parent with stability: In West
Virginia, for example, the Supreme Court upheld a TPR only after the
agency arranged a post-TPR visitation plan with the respondent parent,
and it instructed the lower courts to consider this option in future
cases. 356 Similarly, in Nebraska, the juvenile court retains jurisdiction to
enter orders following the termination of a parent's rights which are
consistent with the best interests of the children, including provision for
continued contact with a natural parent. 357 Massachusetts has held
likewise, and also allows a TPR order to be modified if there are
changed circumstances post-trial, including when an adoption is no
longer feasible. 358 Also, as discussed, because of the epidemic of legal
orphans, some states now allow young people to petition to vacate their
parents' TPRs, 359 although this is a band-aid, not a solution, to
problematic court findings.
Alternative living arrangements also can be utilized for children with
mentally disabled parents, where appropriate. In Delaware, a court
rejected a TPR in favor of an alternative planned permanent living
arrangement where the 14 year-old child had thriving relationships with
both her foster mother and her natural mother, and where the mentally
disabled respondent mother had been providing assistance to the foster
parent with the child's transportation and other needs. 36 Cases like this
one illustrate the possibility of agreements, whether in or out of court,
that can be made between biological and foster parents. These
arrangements are especially important for mentally disabled parents,

°

354

22 A.D.3d 915 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).
26 A.D.3d 332, 333 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).
356
In re Daniel D., 562 S.E.2d 147, 160-61 (W. Va. 2002).
357
In re Stacey D., 684 N.W.2d 594, 603 (Neb. Ct. App. 2004).
358
In re Adoption of Cesar, 856 N.E.2d 198, 204 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006).
359
Supra note 313.
360
In re Division ofFamily Services, 2003 WL 22265071 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2003).
355
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many of whom can be primary caretakers if they receive support, 361 or
who can provide assistance to another caretaker. A solution of this kind
may have been possible with Tanya, who had a strong reciprocal bond
with her daughter as well as an amiable relationship with the foster
mother. Terminating Tanya's rights may not have been necessary, if an
alternative were available which allowed all of the people in Gaby's life
to work together.
In fact, thirty-nine states have legalized a crucial alternative:
subsidized guardianship. 362 Subsidized guardianship provides relatives
and other caregivers the opportunity to become permanent legal
guardians for children when neither returning the child to the disabled
parent's home nor adoption is appropriate. 363 Some states even allow
this alternative to be ordered at the conclusion of a TPR, instead of
terminating parental rights, even when the grounds for termination are
proven. 364 But New York is not such a state, 365 having failed to enact
361

Supra notes 103, 148, and 281-82; see also In re Eden F., 741 A.2d 873, 892
(Conn. 1999) (holding that a parent does not have to prove that she is able to
assume full responsibility for her child, unaided by available support systems, to
avoid a TPR).
362
CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, STATES' SUBSIDIZED GUARDIANSHIP LAWS AT
A GLANCE (2004),
http://www.childrensdefense.org/site/DocServer/guardianship_laws. pdf? doc ID=
544.
363
"Some . . . caregivers choose not to adopt because they do not want to
permanently alter family relationships or remain hopeful that the child's parents
will address their problems and be able to resume caring for the child.
Sometimes older children do not want to be adopted and sever legal ties to their
parents, even though they wish to live permanently with a relative. In some
cultures, terminating parental rights is contrary to cultural norms that value
extended family and mutual interdependence."
Id.
States subsidize
guardianship through a variety of local, state, and federal funding sources. The
programs vary significantly, but the universal goal is to provide permanency for
children by preventing them from entering, or enabling them to exit, state
custody, without severing parental rights. Id. Most states (31) require that the
child be in state care prior to receiving the subsidy, although the majority do not
specify a minimum time length. Id.
364
In Kansas, the court may award permanent guardianship at the end of a TPR
proceeding, even if the grounds were proven, in lieu of granting TPR. KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 38-2272 (2006). The same is true in Mississippi, although
Mississippi's guardianship is not subsidized. Mrss. CODE ANN. § 93-15-103
(2007). If a child is being cared for by a relative, this also is a compelling
reason for an agency not to file a TPR under ASF A and many state statutes.
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subsidized guardianship legislation in 1996366 and again in 1997. 367 New
York does have post-adoption agreements, which are now legally
enforceable as contracts if they are part of the original adoption order. 368
But a parent still has to surrender her rights (and many, like Tanya, are
unwilling to do so), or those rights must be terminated, which, as
discussed, can be psychologically traumatic for both parent and child,
and against the child's best interest.
It is time to reform the black-and-white decision-making process
behind too many TPRs, and to protect both the rights of mentally
disabled parents and the interests of their children, consistent with the
mandates and guidance of the ADA. New York and other states' laws
should be reformed so that all parents receive services, that these
services are tailored and accommodating, and that all TPR
determinations are based on a comprehensive examination of a parent's
abilities, as demonstrated through fulfillment of a sound service plan.
But aside from, and perhaps more important than, legal reform, it is time
for agencies, lawyers, and judges to be more flexible and fluid in their
decision-making, allowing children to maintain all of the important
Supra note 290. But this does not necessarily result in permanency or release
from the foster care system; it only means that parental rights will not be
terminated. In order to exit the foster care system, guardianship or custody must
transfer from the state to the relative or another adult in the child's life.
365
Supra note 362.
366
In 1996, Congress passed an amendment to the Social Security Act offering
states the option to apply for a waiver allowing them to continue receiving
federal funding for children in child protective proceedings while testing
alternative approaches for kinship care. NEW YORK SUBSIDIZED GUARDIANSHIP
(Generations United, Washington D.C.), available at http://ipath.gu.org/
documents/AO/GU_NY.pdf. New York did not submit an application for a
waiver. Id. Waivers to the Social Security Act still are available, although New
York has yet to apply. Supra note 362. Funding is also available from other
federal sources, such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
program funds, and Title XX Social Services Block Grant (SSBG) Funds. Id.
367
In 1997, when ASFA was enacted, many states established subsidized
guardianship as a permanency option for children in kinship care. New York
did not do so. NEW YORK SUBSIDIZED GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 369. Ever
since, there has been a movement in New York urging state officials to pass
legislation that supports "subsidized kinship guardianship," but no such law has
passed. FEDERATION OF PROTESTANT AGENCIES, INC., SUBSIDIZED KINSHIP
GUARDIANSHIP: IT'S TIME (2002).
368
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §112-b (2006). See also Ronald D., Sr. v. Doe, 673
N.Y.S.2d 559, 561 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
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relationships in their lives when appropriate. No one is an island,
especially not a child. Why strand a young person when we can at least
consider building and strengthening his bridges?

178

Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law

[Vol. 15:1

Appendix A
STATE COURT DECISIONS REGARDING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE ADA
TO TPRs AND THE USE OF THE ADA AS A DEFENSE AT TPRs
States that have applied the ADA to
TPRs

IA, KS, MT, WA

States that have acknowledged the
relevance of the ADA to TPRs

AK, AR, IN, MI, NM

States holding that services must be
non-discriminatory, despite finding
that the ADA is not applicable to
TPRs

VT

States holding that an ADA violation
can be raised in a child protective
proceeding, but must be done prior
toTPR

IA, MA, NY

State holding that TPRs are not
"services, programs, or activities"
under the ADA

CA, CT, LA, MA, MI, NY,
RI, VT

States holding that the ADA
unrelated to TPRs

FL, VT, WI

IS

States holding that a dismissal of a
TPR is not a remedy for an ADA
violation

AR, CA, CO, CT, FL, HI,
IN, MA, MI, MO, NY, OH,
PA, TXVT, WI

States holding that parents must
raise ADA violations m separate
lawsuits or procedures according to
the ADA

CA, CT, HI, MA, NY, OH,
VT,WI
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Appendix B

REUNIFICATION SERVICES FOR MENTALLY DISABLED PARENTS:

30 STATES REQUIRING SERVICES
{AND DC)

20 STATES NOT REQUIRING
SERVICES

State

Statute

State

Statute

Alabama

ALA. CODE § 26-187(a)(6) (2007)

Alaska

ALASKA
STATE
§ 47.10.086
(c)(5) (2006)

Arkansas

ARK. CODE ANN.§ 9-27341 (b )(3)(B)(i)(a)-(b)
(Supp. 2007)

Arizona

ARIZ. REV.
STAT.ANN.
§ 8846(B )( 1)(b)
(2007)

Delaware

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 1103(d) (2006)

California

CAL. WELF.
&INST.
CODE
§ 361.5(c)
(West 2007)

Georgia

GA. CODE ANN.§ 15-1158 (2006)

Colorado

COLO.REV.
STAT.§ 193-604( 1)(b)
(2007)

Hawaii

HAW. REV. STAT.§ 58726 (2006)

Connecti cut

CONN.GEN.
STAT.
§ 17a-l 12U)
(2006)
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Idaho

JDAHO CODE ANN. § 161621 (2007)

Florida

FLA. STAT.
ANN.
§ 39.8055(1)
(d) (West
2006)

Illinois

20 ILL. COMP. STAT.
505/5(1) (2007); 325 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/8.2
(2007)

Kentucky

KY.REV.
STAT.ANN.
§ 610.127(6)
(West 2007)

Indiana

IND. CODE ANN.§ 31-3421-5.5 (West 2007)

Maine

ME.REV.
STAT.ANN.
tit. 22,
§ 4041(2)
(A-2)(1)-(2)
(2007)

Iowa

IOWA CODE § 232.102( 5)
(2007)

Massachusetts

MASS.GEN.
LAWS ch.
119, § 29C
(2007)

Kansas

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 382269(b)(7) (2006)

Minnesota

MINN. STAT.
§ 260.012(a)
(5) (2007)

Louisiana

LA. CHILD CODE ANN.
art. 675(B)(2) (2003)

Montana

MONT.CODE
ANN.§ 41-3609(4)(B)
(2005)

Maryland

Mo. CODE ANN., FAM.
LAW§ 5-524 (West
2007)

Nevada

NEV.REV.
STAT.
§ 432B.550
(6)(a)(2)
(2005)
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Michigan

MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 712A.18f(2007)

New
Mexico

N.M.STAT.
§ 32A-428(B)(2)
(2007)

Mississippi

MISS. CODE ANN. § 4321-609(t)(iii) (2007)

New York

N.Y. Soc.
SERV.LAW
§ 384-b(4)(c)
(McKinney
2007)

Missouri

Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 211.183 (West 2007)

North
Carolina

N.C.GEN.
STAT.§ 7B507(b)(l)
(2007)

Nebraska

NEB. REV. STAT. § 43283.01 (2006)

South
Carolina

S.C.CODE
ANN.§ 20-71572 (2006)

New
Hampshire

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 169-C:24-a(III)(c)
(West 2007)

Utah

UTAH CODE
ANN.
§ 78-3a311(3)(d)(i)
(B) (2007)

New
Jersey

N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 30:4C11.3 (West 2007)

Vermont

VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 33,
§ 5515(±)
(2006)

North
Dakota

N.D. CENT. CODE § 2720-32.2 (2005)

West
Virginia

W.VA.
CODE§ 496-5(b)(6)
(2006)

Ohio

OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2151.419 (West 2007)

Wyoming

WYO.STAT.
ANN.§ 14-2309(c)(iii)
(2007)
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Oklahoma

OKLA. STAT. tit. 10,
§ 7003-4.6 (2007)

Oregon

OR. REV. STAT.
&419B.340 (2005)

Pennsylvania

42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN.§ 6351(b)(2)
(West 2006)

Rhode Island

R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 157-7 (2006)

South Dakota

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 26-8A-21 (2007)

Tennessee

TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 37-1-166 (2006)

Texas

TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN.§ 161.003(a)(4)
(Vernon 2007)

Virginia

VA. CODE ANN.
§ 16.1-283(B)(2)
(2007)

Washington

WASH. REV. CODE
§ 13.34.132 (2007)

Washington,
DC

D.C. CODE § 41301.09a (2007)

Wisconsin

WIS. ANN. STAT.
§ 48.355 (West 2006)
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Appendix C
MENTALLY DISABILITY AS GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION

33 STATES WITH (INCLUDING WI)

17 STATES (AND DC) WITHOUT

State

Statute

State

Statute

Alabama

ALA. CODE § 2618-7 (2007)

Connecticut

CONN.GEN.
STAT.§ 45a-715
(2007)

Alaska

ALASKA STAT.
§ 47.10.011
(2006)

Florida

FLA. STAT.
§ 39.802 (2007)

Arizona

ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN.§ 8-533
(2007)

Idaho

IDAHOCODE
ANN.§ 16-1624
(2007)

Arkansas

ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 9-27-341 (2007)

Indiana

IND. CODE ANN.
§31-35-2-4
(2007)

California

CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 7826
(West 2007)

Louisiana

LA. CHILD.
CODE ANN. art.
1015(2006)

Colorado

COLO. REV.
STAT.§ 19-3-604
(2007)

Maine

ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22,
§ 4055 (2007)

Delaware

DEL. CODE ANN.
tit.13,§ 1103
(2006)

Michigan

MICH. COMP.
LAWS
§ 712A.19b
(2007)

Georgia

GA. CODE ANN.
§ 15-11-94
(2006)

Minnesota

MINN. STAT.
§ 260C.301
(2007)
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New Jersey

N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 30:4C-15.l
(2007)

Illinois

705 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 405/2-3
(2007)

New Mexico

N.M. STAT.
§ 32A-4-28
(2007)

Iowa

IOWACODE
§ 232.116 (2007)

North
Dakota

N.D.CENT.
CODE§ 27-2020.1 (2005)

Kansas

KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 38-2269 (2006)

Pennsylvania

23 PA. CONS.
STAT.ANN.
§ 2511
(West2006)

Kentucky

KY. REV. STAT.
ANN.§ 610.127
(West 2007)

Rhode Island

Maryland

MD. CODE ANN.,
FAM. LAW§ 5523 (West 2007)

South
Dakota

S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 26-8A26 (2007)

Massachusetts

MASS. GEN.
LAWS CH. 119,
&24 (2007)

Tennessee

TENN.CODE
ANN.§ 37-1-147
(2006}

Mississippi

MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 93-15-103
(2007)

Vermont

VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15A, § 3-504
(2006)

Missouri

Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 211.447 (West
2007)

Washington,
DC

D.C. CODE§ 162353 (2007)

Montana

MONT. CODE
ANN.§ 41-3-609
(2005)

Wyoming

WYO. STAT.
ANN.§ 14-3-431
(2007)

Hawaii

HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 571-61 (2006)

R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 15-7-7(2006)
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Nebraska

NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 42-364 (2006)

Nevada

NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN.§ 128.106
(West 2007)

New
Hampshire

N.H. REV. STAT.
§ 170-C:5 (2007)

New York

N.Y. Soc. SERV.
LAW§ 384-b
(McKinney 2007)

North
Carolina

N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN.§ 7B-1111
(West 2007)

Ohio

OHIO REV. CODE
ANN.§ 2151.353
(West 2007)

Oklahoma

OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10,
§ 7006-1.1
(West 2007)

Oregon

OR. REV. STAT.
§ 419B.504
(2006)

South
Carolina

S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 20-7-1572
(2006)

Texas

TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN.§ 161.003
(Vernon 2007)
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Utah

Virginia

UTAH CODE
ANN.§ 78-3a-408
(2007)
VA. CODE ANN.

& 16.1-283 (2007)

Washington

WASH.REV.
CODE
§ 13.34.180
(2007)

West Virginia

W. VA.CODE
&49-6-5 (2006)

Wisconsin

WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 48.415
(West 2006)
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Appendix D
STATES THAT CONTEMPLATE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD
SIMULTANEOUSLY AS TPR (EVERY STATE EXCEPT NEW YORK)

State

Statute

Alabama

ALA. CODE &26-18-7 (2006)

Alaska

ALASKA STAT.§ 47.10.088 (2006)

Arizona

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 8-533 (2007)

Arkansas

ARK. CODE ANN.§ 9-27-341 (2007)

California

CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 366.26
(2007)

Colorado

COLO. REV. STAT.§ 19-3-602 (2007)

Connecticut

CONN. GEN. STAT.§ 45A-715 (2007)

Delaware

13 DEL. CODE ANN. & 1103 (2006)

Florida

FLA. STAT. &39.802 (2007)

Georgia

GA. CODE ANN.§ 15-11-94 (2006)

Hawaii

HAW. REV. STAT.§ 571-61 (2006)

Idaho

IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 16-1624 (2007)

Illinois

705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-21 (2007)

Indiana

IND. CODE ANN. § 31-35-2-4 (2007)

Iowa

IOWA CODE § 232.111 (2007)

Kansas

KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 38-2365 (2006)
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Kentucky

KY. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 625.050
(West 2006)

Louisiana

LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1015 (2006)

Maine

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4055
(2007)

Maryland

MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW§ 5-337
(West2007)

Massachusetts

MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 119, § 29C (2007)

Michigan

MICH. COMP. LAWS § 7 l 2A.19b (2007)

Minnesota

MINN. STAT.§ 260C.301 (2007)

Mississippi

MISS. CODE ANN.§ 93-15-103 (2007)

Missouri

Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 211.452 (West 2007)

Montana

MONT. CODE ANN.§ 41-3-604 (2005)

Nebraska

NEB. REV. STAT.§ 42-292 (2006)

Nevada

NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 128.105
(WEST 2006)

New Hampshire

N.H. REV. STAT.§ 169-C:24 (2007)

New Jersey

N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 30:4C-15.l (2007)

New Mexico

N.M. STAT.§ 32A-4-28 (2007)

North Carolina

N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 7B-l 104
(West 2007)

North Dakota

N.D. CENT. CODE§ 27-20-20.l (2005)
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Ohio

OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 2151.414
(West 2007)

Oklahoma

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7006-1.1
(West2007)

Oregon

OR. REV. STAT.§ 419B.500 (2005)

Pennsylvania

23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
&2511 (West 2007)

Rhode Island

R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7 (2006)

South Carolina

S.C. CODE ANN.§ 20-7-768 (2006)

South Dakota

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 26-8A-26 (2007)

Tennessee

TENN. CODE ANN.§ 37-1-147 (2006)

Texas

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.§ 161.003
(Vernon 2007)

Utah

UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4A-203.5 (2007)

Vermont

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 3-504 (2007)

Virginia

VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283 (2007)

Washington

WASH. REV. CODE & 13.34.132 (2007)

Washington, DC

D.C. CODE & 16-2353 (2007)

West Virginia

W. VA. CODE§ 49-6-5b (2006)

Wisconsin

WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 48.417 (West 2006)

Wyoming

WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 14-3-431 (2007)

